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Executive Summary 
A life cycle cost (LCC) analysis was performed to meet the requirements of the Constellation 
Architecture Requirements Document (CARD) General Program Policy. The objective of this 
sub-element of the task, Refractory Materials for Flame Deflector Protection System Corrosion 
Control, was to perform an LCC analysis that compares the operational LCC, processing/ 
turnaround timelines, and operations manpower inspection/ repair/ refurbishment requirements 
for corrosion protection of Kennedy Space Center Launch Pad Flame Deflector associated with 
the existing cast-in-place materials and a newer advanced refractory ceramic material. The LCC 
analysis for the launch pads included costs associated with all damage and potential damage 
resulting from refractory foreign object debris, the costs for repairing the refractory concrete in 
the flame deflectors, the damage resulting to the steel base structure caused by refractory 
concrete cracking or failure, planning and engineering costs associated with the flame deflector 
repair, and other potential costs. It is anticipated that advanced refractory materials would 
provide corrosion protection of critical program operational assets which reduces LCC by 
reducing corrosion failures, decreasing the need for maintenance, and minimizing the 
environmental impact of corrosion protection. 
Reports on the results of four surveys and three trade studies were submitted to the Technology 
Development Program, Advanced Capabilities Division, Exploration Systems Mission 
Directorate prior to the LCC analysis report. Reports on the following surveys were submitted on 
January 16, 2009: 
• Refractory Coating Systems Literature Survey 
• Refractory Ceramics Literature Survey 
• Refractory Material Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Vendors 
• Similar Industries and/or Launch Facilities Surveys 
Reports on the following trade studies were submitted on January 23, 2009: 
• Metal Flame Deflector (with no refractory material) versus New Refractory Materials 
• In-place Curing, Drying, and Sintering of Current Refractory Material versus New 
Refractory Material 
• COTS versus Refractory Material Requirements for Flame Deflector 
The LCC analysis compared the estimated costs of three alternatives for solving the problems 
caused by the current refractory materials used to protect the flame trench: (1) Continued use of 
the current refractory material without any changes; (2) Completely reconstruct the flame trench 
using the current refractory material; (3) Completely reconstruct the flame trench with a new 
high performance refractory material. The costs for the 20 year analysis were estimated based on 
an analysis of the amount of damage that occurs after each launch and an estimate of the average 
repair cost. Alternative 3, developing and implementing a new refractory material, was found to 
save $32 million compared to alternative i and $17 million compared to Alternative 2 over a 
20 year life cycle. 
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A sensitivity analysis was performed to determine which variables most affect the cost savings 
data. The average repair cost was found to have a significant effect on the cost savings. A 
conservative rate of $300/W was used in the analysis and was based on data provided in 
interviews with engineers that oversee the repairs. If the cost and area of the recent repairs on the 
trench walls is used, a repair cost of $600/W is calculated. If this value is used, the total savings 
of Alternative 3 increases to $55 million. Sensitivity analysis in the amount of damage occurring, 
the number of Shuttle launches and the cost of reconstruction of the entire flame trench are 
presented and discussed. 
The economic analysis indicated that the payback period for the research investment to develop 
an alternative new refractory material would be 7 years and that the savings to investment ratio is 
3.2. Potential benefits associated with the improved safety associated with use of the new 
material were not included in the analysis because they are unquantifiable. Inclusion of these 
safety benefits would decrease the payback period and increase the savings to investment ratio. 
Significant benefits can be realized with the development of a new refractory ceramic material. 
iv 
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1 INTRODUCfiON 
During the Technology Prioritization Panel held in December 2007, the Constellation Program 
(CxP) Ground Operations Project (GOP) identified corrosion control technologies as their #2 
technology need for the initial capabilities required to meet the Draft Stretch/Operability 
requirements for reduced ground processing complexity, streamlined integrated testing, and 
operations phase affordability. To address this technology need, the Exploration Technology 
Development Program (ETDP) project, Refractory Materials for Flame Deflector Protection 
System Corrosion Control, was formulated to develop replacement refractory materials that 
exhibit long-term resistance to degradation and will enable supportability at Kennedy Space 
Center (KSC) launch facilities and ground systems through increased operational life cycles. 
The launch complexes at KSC are critical support facilities required for the safe and successful 
launch of vehicles into space. Most of these facilities are over 40 years old and are experiencing 
deterioration. As deterioration of the materials in the launch complex continues, the chance of 
these deteriorated materials becoming a launch debris safety hazard increases. As a result of the 
constant deterioration from launch heat/blast effects and aggressive environmental exposure, the 
refractory materials currently used at the launch pad flame deflectors have become very 
susceptible to failure, resulting in large pieces of refractory materials breaking away from the 
steel base structure. These pieces are projected at high speed during launch, and jeopardize the 
launch complex, vehicle, and safety of the crew. 
Replacement refractory systems must be developed to withstand the extremely corrosive 
environment at the launch pads caused by the highly corrosive hydrochloric acid and heat/blast 
effects that are generated by the solid rocket boosters (SRB) during a launch. Advanced 
technologies for the corrosion protection of launch pad flame deflectors are necessary to address 
these problems, which significantly impact ground processing and launch safety. 
1.1 Background 
NASA uses refractory concrete to protect the steel base structure of the flame deflectors that 
receive and deflect the flames and exhaust from the SRBs and Space Shuttle main engines 
(SSME) during launch, thereby protecting the Space Shuttle and surrounding facilities. The 
current refractory concrete material, Fondu Pyre®, was developed solely for NASA, and is the 
only material available for use. However, it does not meet qualification requirements of the 
current specification, KSC-SPEC-P-00 12 (April25, 1979). Fondu Pyre was grandfathered into 
the qualified products list; was never tested for resistance to SRB acidic exhaust; and loses 
strength as a function of time. Refractory material failures, the size of the damaged area, the loss 
of strength, and frequency, cost, and extent of repairs are increasing with every launch. The 
continued use of this product has resulted in NASA spending significant effort and capital to 
repair the refractory concrete protective lining and the steel base structure. In addition to 
increased efforts and costs, the failure of the refractory concrete during launch results in foreign 
objects and debris (POD) that can damage ground support equipment (GSE) and the Shuttle. 
Figure 1 clearly shows the extent of degradation to Fondu Pyre. 
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Figure 1. Degradation to Fondu Fyre on the SRB Flame Deflector 
Over the last two years, significant liberation of refractory material in the flame trench adjacent 
trench walls, following Space Shuttle launches, have resulted in extensive investigations of 
failure mechanisms, load response, ejected material impact evaluation, and repair design analysis 
(environmental and structural assessment, induced environment from SRB plume, loads 
summary, and repair integrity), assessment of risk posture for flame trench debris, and 
justification of flight readiness rationale. Although the configuration of the launch pad, water and 
exhaust direction, and location of the Mobile Launcher Platform between the flame trench and 
the flight hardware should protect the Space Shuttle Vehicle from debris exposure, loss of 
material could cause damage to a major element of the ground facility (resulting in temporary 
usage loss}, and damage to other facility elements is possible. The near term actions for the 
Shuttle Program are to fix the problem to allow for subsequent planned launches and monitor the 
problem throughout the remainder of the Program. These are all significant risks that will be 
inherited by Ground Operations for Constellation and development of new refractory material 
systems is necessary to reduce the likelihood of the POD hazard during launch. 
Thus for Constellation Ground Operations, developing replacement refractory materials will 
allow the flame deflector protection system to safely meet the requirements of diverting the 
flames, exhaust, and other small items loosened during a launch away from the launch complex 
and vehicle, will preserve structure integrity of the launch complex, lower construction and 
repair costs, reduce high failure rates, and increase safety. The new material must exhibit long-
term resistance to the extremely corrosive Florida coastal environment and the launch 
environment- the highly corrosive SRB hydrochloric acid exhaust, extreme temperature 
fluctuations between SRB heat impingement and subsequent noise suppression water deluge, and 
SRB blast vibrations. 
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1.2 Objectives of the Study 
The objective of the Exploration Technology Development Program (ETDP) project. Refractory 
Materials for Flame Deflector Protection System Corrosion Control, is to develop replacement 
refractory materials that exhibit long-term resistance to degradation. Knowledge gained from the 
development of refractory material systems for flame deflectors will be leveraged to evaluate 
materials and systems for the replacement of refractory fire bricks along the flame trench vertical 
walls. The flame deflector must safely divert flames, exhaust, and small items that are loosened 
during a launch. In essence, the system must prevent debris from bouncing back and hitting the 
launch complex and vehicle. Performance in this regard is dependent upon integrity of the 
refractory materials used on the flame deflectors. 
A sustainable program hinges on how effectively total life cycle costs are managed. 
Developmental costs are a key consideration, but total life cycle costs related to the production, 
processing, and operation of the entire architecture must be accounted for in design decisions to 
ensure future resources are available for ever more ambitious missions into the solar system. 
Historical data shows that typically life cycle costs of a program are set within the first 10% of 
its life and that design solutions (to problems encountered during development) often are not 
adequately scrutinized for their potential impacts on Ground and/or Mission operations impacts 
over the remaining balance of the program. 
The objective of this sub-element task is to perform a life cycle cost (LCC) analysis that 
compares the operational life cycle costs, processing/turnaround timelines, and operations 
manpower inspection/ repair/ refurbishment requirements for corrosion protection of KSC 
Launch Pad Flame Deflector associated with the existing cast-in-place materials and a newer 
advanced refractory ceramic material. The LCC analysis for the launch pads includes costs 
associated with all damage and potential' damage resulting from refractory foreign object debris, 
the costs for repairing the refractory concrete in the flame deflectors, the damage resulting to the 
steel base structure caused by refractory concrete cracking or failure, planning and engineering 
costs associated with the flame deflector repair, and other potential costs. It is anticipated that 
advanced refractory materials would provide corrosion protection of critical program operational 
assets which reduces life cycle cost by reducing corrosion failures, decreasing the need for 
maintenance, and minimizing the environmental impact of corrosion protection. 
This report describes the assets analyzed for the life cycle cost analysis, the damage and failures 
that occur to these assets, quantifies the damage, assigns costs to the damage, and performs an 
economic analysis to assess the feasibility of the proposed research. It should be noted that the 
feasibility study has been performed taking a long-term perspective that considers the overall 
life-cycle of the protection system and launch complex. 
In the current study, the flame deflector system is defined as a set of structures and materials that 
are used to protect the Space Shuttles and GSE from the flames and exhaust produced by the 
SSMEs and SRBs. This system includes the flame deflector and flame trench (walls and floors). 
This economic study compares the economic benefits of implementing a new ceramic lining 
material into the flame deflector system at Launch Complex 39A (LC 39A) and Launch 
Complex 39B (LC 39B). 
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The feasibility will be assessed by identifying the damage that occurs during launches, 
associating costs with this damage, quantifying the costs, and then performing a life-cycle cost 
analysis to assess the value of performing such research. Alternatively, if the analysis shows that 
potential economic benefits do not meet NASA requirements, a recommendation will be made to 
not pursue the research. 
1.3 Corrosion of the KSC Launch Environment 
The launch facilities at KSC are approximately 1 ,000 feet from the Atlantic Ocean. The seacoast 
marine location is extremely corrosive to structural steel. In fact, the beachside location at KSC 
is documented as one of the most corrosive environments in the world. Table 1 shows the 
corrosion rates for the KSC Beachside Atmospheric Exposure Test Site. The corrosion rates in 
the table clearly show the aggressiveness of the KSC locale, in relation to the others that are 
listed. 
KSC launch facilities and GSE are exposed to extremely corrosive marine conditions. As if those 
natural conditions were not bad enough, in 1981, the Space Shuttle introduced a more aggressive 
environment to the limnch pads at KSC. Exhaust from the SRBs resulted in the deposition of 
small alumina (Al203) particles with hydrochloric acid adsorbed onto their surface. It is 
estimated that 70 tons of hydrochloric acid are generated during a Space Shuttle launch. The 
impingement of this acidic exhaust results in the failure of refractory materials, despite the fact 
that a pressure wash-down is performed immediately after launch. 
Table 1. Corrosion Rates of Carbon Steel Calibrating Specimens at Various 
Locations1 
Location Type of Environment emJyr mils/yr 
Esquimalt, Vancouver Island, Rural marine 13 0.5 
BC, Canada 
Pittsburgh, P A Industrial 30 1.2 
Cleveland, OH Industrial 38 1.5 
Limon Bay, Panama Tropical marine 61 2.4 
East Chicago, IL Industrial 84 3.3 
Brazos River, TX Industrial marine 94 3.7 
Daytona Beach, FL Marine 295 11.6 
Pont Reyes, CA Marine 500 19.7 
Kure Beach, NC (24 m from Marine 533 21 
ocean) 
Galeta Point Beach, Panama Marine 686 27 
Kennedy Space Center, FL Marine 1070 42 
(Beach) 
1 S. Coburn (1978), "Atmospheric Corrosion," in American Society for Metals, Metals Handbook, Properties and 
Selection, Carbon Steels, Metals Park, Ohio, 9th ed. , Vol. I , p. 720. 
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In response to the SRB exhaust problem, studies were conducted at KSC to increase the chemical 
resistance of f.rotective coatings and materials in response to this more aggressive propulsion 
system.2.3·4•5• •7•8 Because of these studies, the NASA Coatings Standard, NASA-STD-5008, 
Protective Coating of Carbon Steel, Stainless Steel, and Aluminum on Launch Structures, 
Facilities, and Ground Support Equipment, was revised to incorporate additional zones of 
exposure with coating requirements for surfaces that receive acid deposition from SRB exhaust 
products. 
2 FLAME DEFLECTOR SYSTEM 
The flame deflector systems at LC 39A and LC 39B are critical to protect NASA assets that 
include the Space Shuttle, GSE, and personnel. As the name implies, the system diverts rocket 
exhaust away from critical structures through its geometric design. Further benefits are provided 
by a water deluge system that dampens acoustic vibrations and high temperatures associated with 
launches. 
Flame deflectors are typically covered with a beat resistive material that protects the flame 
deflector from erosion, ablation, and extreme temperatures that are produced by the rocket 
propulsion systems. If this refractory layer is compromised, deterioration to the flame deflector 
and other load bearing structures may result. Once compromised, the refractory material and 
flame deflector substructures can turn into unwanted projectiles known as FOD that can cause 
consequent damage. 
2.1 Main Flame Deflector and Flame Trench 
LC 39A and 39B were originally designed to support the Apollo Program. With the advent of the 
Shuttle Program, the Saturn era flame deflectors were replaced. Figure 2 shows a schematic cross 
section of the flame deflector at LC 39A. The flame deflector system consists of a flame trench, 
a main flame deflector (MFD), and a pair of side flame deflectors (SFD). The main flame 
deflector is designed in an in inverted, V -shaped configuration, is constructed from structural 
2 D. Ruggieri and Anne Rowe, Evaluation of Carbon Steel, Aluminum Alloy, and Stainless Steel Protective Coating 
Systems After 18 Months of Seacoast Exposure, NASA Technical Memorandum 103503, May 1984. 
3 L.G. MacDowell, Evaluation of Protective Coating Systems for Carbon Steel Exposed to Simulated SRB Effluent 
after 18 months of Seacoast Exposure, NASA Report No. MTB-268-868, February 1988. 
4 L.G. MacDowell, Volatile Organic Content (VOC) Compliant Coating Systems for Carbon Steel Exposed to the 
STS Launch Environment- Application, Laboratory and 18 Month Exposure Results, NASA Report 
No. FAM-93-2004, February 23, 1993. 
5 L.G. MacDowell, Testing VOC-Compliant Coating Systems at Kennedy Space Center, Materials Performance, 32, 
p. 26-33 (1993). 
6 L.M. Calle and L.G. MacDowell, Improved Accelerated corrosion Testing of Zinc-Rich Primers, NASA Tech 
Briefs, 24, p. 78, (2000). 
7 L.M. Calle and L.G. MacDowell, Evaluation oflnorganic Zinc-Rich Primers Using Electrochemical Impedance 
Spectroscopy (EIS) in Combination with Atmospheric Exposure, in proceedings ofNACE International Conference 
on Corrosion in Natural and Industrial Environments: Problems and Solutions, May 23-25, 1995, Grado (Gorizia), 
Italy. 
8 L.M. Calle and L.G. MacDowell, Evaluation oflnorganic Zinc-Rich Primers Using Electrochemical Impedance 
Spectroscopy (EIS) in Combination with Atmospheric Exposure, NASA Report No. 94-2082, John F. Kennedy 
Space Center Florida, April 17, 1995. 
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steel, and is covered with refractory concrete material. One side of the inverted "V" deflects the 
flames and exhaust from the SSME and the opposite side deflects the flames and exhaust from 
the SRBs. Additional protection is provided by a "secondary system," which consists of two 
movable side deflectors at the top of the trench that provides additional protection from SRB 
exhaust. The orbiter side of the new flame deflectors is 38ft high, 72ft long and 57ft wide. The 
SRB side of the flame deflector is 42 ft high, 42 ft long and 57 ft wide. The total mass of the 
asset is over 1 million pounds.9 
Back Wall 
Not to Scale 
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Figure 2. Cross Section of Flame Deflector at LC 39A 
North 
Side 
The flames from the main engines and the SRBs are channeled down opposite sides of the flame 
deflector. The deflector is constructed of steel on a structural steel 1-beam framework. To protect 
the structure from serious degradation during launch, the faces of the flame deflector are lined 
with refractory concrete. This product is known as Fondu Pyre W A-1 G supplied by the Pryor 
Giggey Co. The thickness of the refractory concrete is 6 inches on the SRB side, 4.5 inches on 
the SSME side, and 4 inches on the side deflectors. 
Figure 3 shows the configuration of the Shuttle viewed upward from the flame trench. The 
openings for the Space Shuttle exhaust and the flame deflector used to divert the rocket plume 
from the SRBs are labeled. The other side of the flame deflector, which is not visible in the 
picture, diverts the exhaust from the main engines. The SRBs burn at approximately 3,000 °C, 
while that of the exhaust from the Shuttle main engines is considerably lower. Consequently, the 
higher temperatures of the SRB exhaust lead to more severe exposure conditions and result in 
damage that is more significant to the deflector. 
9 Launch Complex 39A and 39B, htto://science.ksc.nasa.gov/facilities/lc39a.html, 
(Last accessed December 17, 2008. 
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Figure 3. Openings for Flames from the Main Engine and SRBs 
Figure 4 shows a magnified view of the flame deflector underneath the SRBs. The image shows 
the structural steel at the bottom of the deflector which is protected with Fondu Fyre. Figure 5 
shows the SSME flame trench and deflector. 
Figure 4. Magnified View of LC 39A Flame Deflector 
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Figure 5. SSME Flame Trench 
Safely meeting the flame deflector requirements of diverting the flame, exhaust, and small items 
that are dislodged during launch, is dependent on the integrity and performance of the materials 
used to construct the flame deflectors. The use of refractory products that have superior material 
characteristics (under launch conditions) is necessary to protect the flame deflector, Space 
Shuttle, GSE, and launch personnel. 
3 DETERIORATION AND REPAIR OF LAUNCH COMPLEXES 
The launch complexes at KSC are critical support facilities that are required for the successful 
launch of space based vehicles. Most of these facilities are over 40 years old, and consequently, 
are experiencing deterioration. As a result of the constant deterioration from launch heat/blast 
effects and environmental exposure, the refractory materials used at LC 39A and LC 39B have 
become susceptible to failure, resulting in large sections of refractory material breaking away 
from the base structure and creating high-speed projectiles during launch. These projectiles 
jeopardize the safety of the launch complex, crew, and vehicle. Postlaunch inspections have 
revealed that the number and frequency of repairs, as well as the area and size of the damage, is 
increasing with the number of launches. 
3.1 Observed Failures in the Launch Complexes 
Spalled and dislodged refractory concrete, and firebrick that is missing from the walls of the 
flame trench, are anomalies that are routinely observed after a launch. Examples of these 
"typical" problems were witnessed and recorded on a walkdown ofLC 39A after the launch of 
STS-126 (November 14, 2008). 
Typically, spalled regions are more prevalent on the SRB side of the flame trench where the 
corrosive conditions are exaggerated by the acidic exhaust and airborne particulate matter of 
these motors. After the launch of STS-126, a similar spalled and dislodged region was found on 
the SSME side of the flame deflector (Figure 6). This section of refractory concrete was located 
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halfway down the length of the flame trench. A picture of the dislocated concrete section is 
shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 6. STS-126 SpaDed and Dislodged Concrete Section 
Figure 7. Section of Refractory Concrete Dislodged During the Launch of STS-126 
This anomaly may have resulted from the seepage of water through the cracked refractory 
concrete. It is possible that corrosion of the grid steel reduced the adhesion between the 
refractory and base material. During launch, the water under the concrete section may have 
turned to steam, lifting the section from the surface. 
Firebrick that has been dislodged from the walls of the flame trench is another anomaly that is 
frequently seen after a Shuttle launch. An example of this phenomenon witnessed on the SRB 
side of the LC 39A flame deflector after STS-126 is shown in Figure 8 
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Figure 8. Missing Refractory Brick at LC 39A 
A non-typical example of flame trench degradation occurred during the launch of STS-124 on 
May 31 , 2008 when serious damage to the east walls of the flame trench occurred during the 
launch of the Space Shuttle Discovery. Blast from the SRBs resulted in the expulsion of around 
3,540 firebricks (16 percent of the wall) from the flame trench walls (Figure 9). The interlocking 
firebricks were attached to the 3 foot thick concrete substructure with epoxy and dove-tail metal 
clips. The metal clips, attached to slotted channel embedded in concrete, are installed 
horizontally to every other brick, and vertically at every sixth row.10 
Figure 9. Extensive Dislocation of Firebrick on May 31,2008 
10 Spacefl ight Now I STS-124 Shuttle Report, http://spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/stsl24/080612pad/index.html (Last 
accessed January 14, 2009). 
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These sections of refractory brick were ejected downrange from the launch site and beyond the 
perimeter fence at LC 39A. The total distance traveled by some of the firebrick was over 
1,500 feet. 11 Figure 10 12 and Figure 11 13 show the extent of FOD that was produced by the 
bricks that were tom away from the flame trench walls. 
Figure 10. Refractory Concrete Bricks Torn Away From the Flame Trench 
11 Interview with John Lane; ASRC Aerospace Corporation; January 14, 2009. 
12 http: //www.usatoday.com/tech/science/space/2008-06-27-nasa-launch-pad-repairs N.htm. 
13 http://www.collectspace.com/ubb/Forum30/HTMU000701-2.html (Last accessed January 26, 2009). 
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Figure 11. Refractory Concrete Bricks Around Fences 
While this example of extensive destruction of refractory structures is not the norm, the cost 
associated with its repair was very high (estimated at 2.7 million U.S. dollars). Ultimately, the 
firebrick was replaced with Fondu Fyre refractory concrete that was gunned in place. 
3.2 Classification of Repair Activities 
Repair and maintenance activities are classified according to the following flame deflector areas: 
• The steel base frame of the MFD. The steel base frame was constructed using 
conventional carbon steel. 
• The refractory concrete exposed to the SRB and SSME exhaust impingement on the 
exterior of the MFD and SFDs. 
• The walls and floor of the flame trench, which is concrete that is lined with refractory 
firebrick. 
For the analysis in this report, repairs are categorized into minor and major classifications. Minor 
repairs are performed by in-house personnel, while the more extensive and costly major repairs 
are performed by outside contractors. The differentiation between minor and major repairs 
depends on 
• time constraints, 
• the size of the repair, 
• availability of personnel resources and installation equipment (casting vs. gunning), and 
• FOD induced security issues that result from damage to perimeter fences and constraints. 
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3.3 Evaluation of Repair Needs 
Inspections are usually performed by visual and mechanical nondestructive sounding methods. 
The repair requirements are dependent upon size, location, extent of fractures and cracks in the 
refractory concrete cover, and the extent of missing sections or pieces of refractory concrete. The 
desired condition of the post launch refractory concrete protection system requires that there are 
no spalls or missing pieces of refractory concrete cover and cracking of the refractory concrete 
cover material that is characterized as being no more than 1/8 inch wide, 12 inches long, and 
I inch deep. Often, cracking can be found in areas adjacent to the loosened concrete. If the 
dimensions of the cracks fall outside these parameters, remediation of these areas is required per 
Maximo job plan #27354. 14 
3.3.1 Steel Structure of Main Flame Deflector 
Corrosion of the base steel structure is dependent on the condition of the refractory material. The 
refractory material acts as a barrier to the aggressive Florida coastal environment (i.e., high 
humidity and chloride exposure). Typically, a sound and uncracked refractory concrete cover 
will prevent corrosion to the base structure, much better than a fractured and cracked layer of 
protection. During launch, hydrochloric acid is produced by the SRBs and is deposited on the 
flame deflector surface. This solution is extremely corrosive to the structural steel base structure. 
A fractured and cracked refractory coating will allow the hydrochloric acid to permeate through 
to the base structure, thereby accelerating its corrosion. 
The flame deflector's structural steel is routinely inspected for corrosion. After inspection, a 
decision is made as to what corrective action is needed. Minor repairs are performed when only 
loose rust and/or corrosion debris is present. Typically, these repairs do not require sandblasting 
and are performed by in-house personnel. Major repairs are performed for more severe corrosion 
conditions. These repairs typically require sandblasting and are performed by outside 
contractors. 
3.3.2 Refractory Concrete 
The flame deflector is coated with a refractory concrete material (Fondu Fyre); while the walls 
and floor of the flame trench have historically used refractory brick for thermal protection. 
Once compromised, the general methodology used to repair the refractory concrete surface 
includes 
• removing loose or damaged refractory concrete sections by cutting or hydro-blasting 
unwanted material (Figure 12), 
• welding and repairing grid steel or Nelson studs to the base steel, and 
• casting or gunning refractory concrete in place. 
14 E-mail correspondence with Chris Parlier; NASA Structural Engineering; January 29, 2009. 
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Figure 12. Cut-Out Section of a Refractory Material on LC 39A Repair, Showing the 
Underlying Grid Steel Honeycomb Structure With Steel Nelson Studs Protruding Outward 
When the amount of refractory damage is too large for efficient removal and replacement by in-
house personnel, a fixed price contract is generated so outside contractors can perform the prior 
outlined procedures. 
3.3.3 Repair of the Refractory Bricks on Trench Walls 
The refractory materials that line the flame trench dislodge on a fairly regular basis due to the 
extreme conditions generated by the Space Shuttle's propulsion system. 
Various factors prevent the replacement of refractory frrebrick with a "like product." Foremost is 
the unavailability of product A.P. Green, the original supplier, no longer manufactures it. The 
product dimensions and material formulation are unique to NASA. Furthermore, the dry-set 
tongue and groove design, as well as the methodology to secure the bricks to the flame trench 
walls, makes single brick replacement difficult and cost-prohibitive. Consequently, when 
firebrick is lost from the flame trench walls, repairs are made by replacing the bricks with 
gunned Fondu Fyre WA-IG. 
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4 INPUT AND DATA ANALYSES 
This chapter discusses the methodology used to generate input data necessary to conduct the 
economic analysis. Analyses were performed using repair cost data and frequencies, Shuttle 
launch frequency and a history of damage to the refractory concrete. 15 This record was 
cross-referenced with archived damage assessment data that was provided by United Space 
Alliance (USA) personnel. 16 
4.1 Repair Costs and Frequency Data 
Repair frequencies and costs for refractory repair and refurbishment were collected. Each 
individual data set provided insight into refractory degradation associated with individual 
components of the entire flame deflector system. These components (along with costs) are 
delineated in Table 2. 
Table 2. Repair Frequencies and Costs 
Material RepaJr Average Project Area Type Type Frequency Cost per Duration Repair 
Steel Structure Minor Postlaunch $16K 2 weeks 
of the 
Main Flame Carbon Steel 
Deflector Major Annually $400K 3 weeks 
The term refractory concrete coating refers to maintenance and repair of refractory concrete 
materials used to protect the surface of the flame deflector. Steel structure of the main flame 
deflector refers to the carbon steel framework that comprises the structural skeleton of the flame 
deflector. Finally, the term flame trench is used to refer to sections away from the flame deflector 
that are protected by refractory materials. These areas include the flame duct walls and floor that 
is protected by refractory firebrick. 
Corrosion cost estimates were collected from NASA and USA engineering personnel during a 
technical interchange. The combined data was required to successfully determine the frequency 
of repair and the costs for the individually classified flame deflector components. 17 
4.1.1 Average Repair Frequencies and Costs 
Table 2 shows average repair frequencies and the costs as a function of each component of the 
flame deflector. These reported values were obtained from questionnaires distributed to NASA 
and contractor personnel. The objective of the questionnaires was to identify cost information 
that may not be identified during this investigation. The questionnaire proved useful by 
providing a measure of "reasonableness" for the documented data. 
15 Engineering Review Board (2008), "Fondu Fyre Historical Liberation" (Action Response for Debris Integration 
Group), NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida. 
16 NASA Refractory Concrete Technical Interchange, August 13, 2008. 
17 ASA Refractory Concrete Technical Interchange, August 13, 2008. 
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As shown in Table 2, for the steel structure of the main flame deflector, the average estimated 
costs of minor and major repairs are approximately $16K and $400K, respectively. Minor repairs 
occur after every Shuttle launch and major repairs occur annually. These costs and frequencies 
cover launch complexes 39A and 39B. Also, the costs represent direct repair costs, which do not 
include contractors' markups and NASA's oversight. The repair activities are classified as minor 
and major as previously described in Section 3. 
Because of the limited availability of refractory firebrick for NASA's applications and as a result 
of the steep labor costs associated with its installation, Fondu Fyre refractory concrete is the 
preferred material for repairs. Consequently, activities used to repair refractory concrete on the 
face of the flame deflector are similar to those used to repair flame trench walls. 
4.1.2 Detailed Structural Steel Costs for the Flame Deflectors 
Costs associated with the flame deflector's structural steel were obtained from United Space 
Alliance (USA). The data included FY 2003 through FY 2008, and is summarized in Table 3. 
Clearly, the costs associated with structural steel repair of the flame deflectors are quite large. As 
the historical data for the past six years indicates, the average expenditure for contracted repairs 
(major efforts) associated with the structural steel is quite large. 
Table 3. Repair Costs for the Main Flame Deflector Steel Structure 
FY Launch Complexes Costs 
39A NA 
2003 &2004 39 B $243,142 
2005 
39A $511 ,231 
398 $271 ,814 
2006 
39A $2,696,425 
39 B $235,917 
39A $473,161 
2007 $201 ,027 39 B 
2008 39A NA 
39 B $430,672 
Sum $5,063,389 
Annual Cost $421 ,949 
A significant refurbishment effort of the flame deflector structural steel at LC 39A occurred in 
2006. Interviews with NASA and USA launch personnel indicated that the complete 
refurbishment of the flame deflector structural steel occurs every ten years (on average).18 
4.1.3 Yearly Flame Duct Repair Costs for Structural Steel 
For both launch complexes, the overall average repair cost for the steel structure was determined 
by considering the different types of repairs: minor and major repairs (shown in Table 2) and 
major rehabilitation costs (the cost from LC 39A during FY 2006 shown in Table 3). The 
18 NASA Refractory Concrete Technica11nterchange, August 13, 2008. 
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rehabilitation cost was rounded to $2. 7M since an exact number from the table implies a high 
accuracy for future estimates. 
Table 4 provides the estimated average annual repair costs for the steel structure, and the average 
(minor) repair costs per Shuttle launch. In Table 4, the minor and major repair costs (of the steel 
structure) are $16K and $400K, respectively. 
Table 4. Estimation of Annual Average Repair Costs for Steel Structure 
Type of Repairs Average Costs Repair Frequency Annual Costs (Direct Costs) 
Minor $16,000 Postlaunch $70,400 (4.4 Launches per Year) 
Major $400,000 Annually $400,000 
Major Rehabilitation $2,700,000 10 Years $270,000 
Average CostlY ear $740,400 
Average Cost per Shuttle Launch (4.4 Launches per Year) $ 168,273 
The minor costs were extrapolated to an annual figure , using the assumption that 4.4 Shuttle 
launches occur per year (there have been total124 Shuttle launches during the last 28 years). 
Major costs were reported as an annual figure, and are summarized as such in Table 4. 
Costs associated with the major rehabilitation of the structural steel were amortized over the 
anticipated life of the structure. For the rehabilitation effort in 2006 allocates $270,000 of the 
cost given a 1 0-year frequency of rehabilitation. 
Based on the estimates in Table 4, the average annual cost for the flame deflector structural steel 
is approximately $740K. This results in an average cost of $168K for each Shuttle launch, and 
assumes 4.4 Shuttle launches occur each year. This figure will be used as a pertinent variable in 
the life cycle analysis section of this report. 
It is important to note that the repair costs (reported in this section) do not include contractor 
markup and NASA oversight. Again, referenced estimates are used in the life cycle analysis 
section of this report. 
4.2 Frequency of Shuttle Launches 
The materials used to repair the refractory concrete lining and the flame trench is the same 
(Fondu Fyre W A-1 G). As a result, the repair activities for the flame deflector and trench can be 
simultaneously analyzed. 
As shown in Table 4, on average, a minor repair of the refractory concrete lining costs 
approximately $16K and is required after every Shuttle launch (not to be confused with the $16K 
repair costs of the steel structure). A major repair for the refractory lining costs approximately 
$300K and is assumed to occur annually. 
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For the flame trench (not the deflector), the average costs of the minor and major repairs were 
assumed to be $16K and $400K, respectively. Minor repairs are assumed to be performed after 
every Shuttle launch, while major repairs are required every 5 years. These costs represent direct 
repair costs, and do not include contractors' markups and NASA's oversight. 
Table 5 shows a summary of the data collected from the questionnaires. After the data was 
collected, the research team found data related to quantities and costs associated with the repair 
of the refractory lining. Consequently, the questionnaire provided a method to check the 
reasonableness of the data. The following sections provide information related to the collection 
of data, and resulting estimates of repair costs. 
TableS. Frequencies and Costs for Refractory Concrete Uning Repairs 
Material Repair Average Project Area Type Type Frequency Cost per Duration Repair 
Refractory Concrete Refractory Minor Postlaunch $16K 2 weeks Concrete Coating (Fondu Fyre) Major Annually $300K 3 weeks 
Walls and Floors of Concrete Lined Minor Postlaunch $6K I week 
the Flame Trench with Refractory Fire Bricks Major 5 Years $400K 3 weeks 
4.3 Frequency of Shuttle Launches 
Shuttle launches result in damage to the flame deflector systems. Repairs are typically performed 
when the damage is identified. Therefore, a correlation between the repairs as a function of 
Shuttle launches was investigated. To assess this possible relationship, the frequency of Shuttle 
launches was assessed. 
Figure 13 shows the number of Shuttle launches that occurred as a function of each launch pad 
over the past 28 years. 19 Appendix A provides the tabulated data that was used to generate the 
figure. 
There have been 124 Shuttle launches since the inception of the Space Shuttle Program. The first 
Shuttle launch occurred in 1981 from LC 39A. Among the 124 Shuttles, 71 (57%) were launched 
at LC 39A, and the remaining 53 (43%) were launched at LC 39B. The first Shuttle launch at 
LC 39B occurred in 1986. Obviously, LC 39A has been used more extensively, and over a 
longer period of time. 
As shown in Figure 13, Space Shuttle launches increased in frequency from 1981 to 1986 while 
NASA ramped up operations. In 1986, the Challenger tragedy curtailed launches for an 
intermittent period of time. A similar halt to Shuttle missions occurred after the Columbia 
tragedy in February 2003. 
19 Space Shuttle Mission Archive, http://www.nasa.gov/mission pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/list main.html (Last 
accessed January 22, 2009). 
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Other than the initial increase (from 1981 to 1986), no other specific pattern in the number of 
launches per year is observed. However, the information on Shuttle launch frequency can be 
useful when it is combined with information related to the degradation caused by the Shuttle 
launches. 
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Figure 13. Space Shuttle Launches by Year and Complex From 1981 Through 2008 
4.4 Repair Frequency Correlated to Shuttle Launches 
NASA's Fondu Fyre damage history provides size measurements and descriptions of refractory 
damage that occurs from the Shuttle launches.20 The document covers the damage to the flame 
deflector, as well as the walls and floors of the flame trench. 
Quantitative size measurements were not available for all of the damage reports. However, the 
frequency of repair activities can be extracted from the data. The data is provided in Appendix B. 
The frequency of repair was combined with the frequency of Shuttle launches to identify 
potential relationships. Figure 14 and Figure 15 are combinational analyses that show the number 
of Shuttle launches and repairs for LC 39A and 39B, respectively. 
A comparison of the number of Shuttle launches with the number of launch pad repairs in 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 shows similar trends. The data indicates that the frequency of repairs, 
compared to the frequency oflaunches, are not well correlated for LC 39A from 1981 to 1987. 
20 Engineering Review Board (2008), "Fondu Fyre Historical Liberation" (Action Response for Debris Integration 
Group), NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida. 
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Limited correlation is also observed for launch and repair frequencies from 1986 to 1989 at 
LC 39B. 
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Figure 15. Frequencies of Shuttle Launches and Repairs- LC 39B 
Since the first Shuttle launch at LC 39 A occurred in 1981, and the first Shuttle launch occurred 
at LC 39B in 1986, latent effects from early launch exposure may be a pertinent factor in the cost 
analysis. This observation indicates that the initial performance of the flame deflector system 
may have exhibited some deterioration with each Shuttle launch, and cumulative effects resulted 
in later deterioration and costs. 
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To better evaluate these latent effects, Figure 16 and Figure 17 are provided to show the 
cumulative number of Shuttle launches and repairs for LC 39A and 39B, respectively. As already 
noted, the number oflaunches at each LC are different (71 at LC 39A .and 53 at LC 39B). 
Figure 16. 
Figure 17. 
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The latent effects are apparent from the cumulative repairs shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17. 
After the initial launch (and after the Challenger tragedy in 1986, parallel increases in the 
cumulative numbers of Shuttle launches and repairs were seen. The data for LC 39B (Figure 17) 
does not show this near parallel tracking. 1n general, it can be concluded that the extent of 
damage increases with increasing Shuttle launches. 
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4.5 Cumulative Repair Rate 
The current analysis evaluates the launch/damage relationship by evaluating the cumulative 
repair rate. The cumulative repair rate is defmed as follows: 
l . . cumulative number of repairs cumu at1ve repa1r rate = --------...::....----!'---
cumulative number of launches [1] 
Figure 18 shows the estimated cumulative repair rate for both LC 39A and LC 39B over the past 
28 years. The launch facilities had different cumulative repair rates early in each structure' s use. 
However, over the years, the cumulative repair rates converged to a similar level at 
approximately 0.5. It should be noted that the rate of repair does not include the significance or 
extent of the damage, nor does it take into account the resulting repair costs. A repair after 
launch (counted as one repair in this analysis) may include multiple repairs of different 
components, such as the SRB MFD, the SSME MFD, the flame trench walls and/or floors , 
and/or the SFD. 
Figure 18. Cumulative Repair Rate 
Note that the cumulative repair rate for the current year is actually the overall average for the last 
28 years. In order to identify the transient trend in the repair rate, weighted moving averages 
were estimated (assuming a 5 year window). 
Figure 19 shows the estimated moving averages. The moving average for the rate of repair 
peaked in the mid-1990s. According to NASA and USA ~ersonnel, major rehabilitation of the 
structures was performed in the 1992 to 1993 timeframe. 1 The most recently calculated moving 
average (of 1.0) indicates that NASA recently performed post launch repairs after every launch, 
which could be a result of structural deterioration of the flame deflector system. 
21 NASA Refractory Concrete Technical Interchange, August 13, 2008. 
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Figure 19. Moving Average of Repair Rates - 5 Year Window 
4.6 Analyses of Fondu Fyre Damage History 
The Fondu Fyre damage history provides qualitative descriptions of the refractory concrete 
damage, and a description of the degree of damage as a function of Shuttle launches. 22 The 
record covers Fondu Fyre damage on the main flame deflector, as well as damage to the trench 
walls and floors. The latter area is partially covered by a combination of refractory concrete 
bricks and Fondu Fyre refractory concrete. 
A detailed analysis was performed using the Fondu Fyre damage histories since the data provides 
the most useful information amongst the available data sources. Unfortunately, information on 
the size of the damaged areas was not available for some of the reported data. The following 
sections provide a description of the approaches and assumptions used to overcome these 
limitations. 
4.6.1 Mismatches Between the Dates of Damage and Launches 
Damage to the Fondu Fyre is directly related to the number of Shuttle launches. According to the 
data, some damage was recorded several months after a Shuttle launch had occurred. Also, other 
launches had multiple damage records after a single launch. To clarify the relationship between 
damage and Shuttle launches, Assumption 1 is proposed. 
Assumption 1: Repairs are made to all damage that occurs during a launch between the 
launch and the next flight from the same launch location. Therefore, damage and repair 
costs are attributed to the preceding Shuttle launch. 
22 Engineering Review Board (2008), "Fondu Fyre Historical Liberation" (Action Response for Debris Integration 
Group), NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida. 
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Based on Assumption 1, all damage entries that are reported between two Shuttle launches are 
summed, and attributed to the previous Shuttle launch. Table 6 provides a summary of damaged 
areas and the dates of the previous Shuttle launches. There have been a total of 71 Shuttle 
launches at LC 39A. However, measurement of the size of the damage is only available for 
16 Space Shuttle launches from LC 39A and 14 from LC 39B. The average sizes of the damaged 
areas at LC 39A and LC 39B (from data that includes size measurements related to damage) are 
approximately 392 and 188 sq. ft., respectively. 
Table 6. Size of Damages with Shuttle Launches- LC 39A and LC 39B 
Launch Complex 39A Launch Complex 398 
No. Date of Launches Size of Damages Date of Launches Size of Damages (Sq. ft.) (Sq. ft) 
I 4/ 12/ 1981 41 1/28/ 1986 238 
2 8/211991 1645 10/6/ 1990 375 
3 9112/ 1991 120 1212/ 1990 720 
4 11124/1991 362 4/5/ 1991 225 
5 1/22/ 1992 530 7/31 / 1992 30 
6 3/24/ 1992 330 4/8/ 1993 55 
7 4/26/1993 209 6121 / 1993 50 
8 2/3/1994 40 9112/ 1993 70 
9 7/8/ 1994 570 1011811993 100 
10 3/211995 246 3/4/1994 355 
II 2/1111997 5 9/911994 245 
12 7/ 1/ 1997 10 6/2011996 90 
13 8/7/1997 21 11 / 19/1997 9 
14 9/25/1997 125 10/29/1998 75 
15 1122/1998 12 
16 5/31 /2008 2000 
Sum 6266 Sum 2637 
Average 391.6 Average 188.4 
4.6.2 Unknown Size of Damaged Areas 
Fondu Fyre damage was recorded for each of the different areas of the flame deflector system.23 
These areas include both the flame deflector and flame trench. 
Table 7 and Table 8 show the total number of damages, the number of damaged areas with size 
measurements, the sum of the sizes of damaged areas, the average size of the damaged areas, and 
the number of damaged areas without size measurements. For the reported damage without size 
measurements, Assumption 2 is proposed: 
Assumption 2: The average size of damaged areas for cases reported in the data will be 
used to estimate the size of the damaged areas for which size information is not available. 
23 Engineering Review Board (2008), "Fondu Fyre Historical Liberation" (Action Response for Debris Integration 
Group), NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida. 
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Based on Assumption 2, which is commonly used to replace missing data in an analysis, the 
damaged areas without size information are assumed to be the same as the average size of the 
damaged areas for data with the recorded information. Consequently, the data in Table 7 and 
Table 8 were used to extrapolate the size of damaged areas for the records that did not have them 
listed. 
Table 7. Damage Data for LC 39A 
39A SRB SSME WestSFD EastSFD Treach Treach WaUCaps MFD MFD WaU Floor 
Number of Damages 27 13 7 6 9 5 3 
Number of Damages 
with 9 6 3 2 3 2 I Actual Size 
Measurement 
Sum (sq. ft.) 3173 666 34 72 2080 141 100 
Average (sq. ft .) 352.6 111.0 11.3 36.0 693.3 70.5 100.0 
Number of Damages 18 7 4 4 6 3 2 
without Size Measures 
Table 8. Damage Data for LC 39B 
398 SRB SSME West East Trench Trench WaD MFD MFD SFD SFD WaD Floor Caps 
Number of Damages 27 4 I 2 6 4 3 
Number of Damages 
with 12 I I 2 3 I 2 Actual Size 
Measurement 
Sum (sq. ft .) 1114 15 45 75 725 238 425 
Average (sq. ft.) 92 .8 15.0 45 .0 37.5 241.7 238.0 212.5 
Number of Damages 
without Size 15 3 0 0 3 3 I 
Measurement 
4.6.3 Size of Repair Area vs. Size of Damaged Area 
A recent failure of the flame trench walls at LC 39A resulted in a significant degree of damage. 
The Fondu Fyre damage records indicated that the size of the damaged was 2,000 sq. ft. 24 Once 
the project was complete, the actual size of the repair had grown to 4,500 sq. ft. 25 In general, the 
size of the repair will be greater than the size of the damaged area. Often, workers must follow 
24 Engineering Review Board (2008), "Fondu Fyre Historical Liberation" (Action Response for Debris Integration 
Group), NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida. 
25 NASA approves Space Shuttle laWlCh pad repair plan. 
http://spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts 124/080626paddarnage (Last accessed January 26, 2009). 
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cracks in the refractory concrete, and cut fissured regions until a solid refractory matrix is 
encountered. 
To adjust for the damage/repair ratio (i.e., from 2,000 sq. ft. to 4,500 sq. ft.}, Assumption 3 was 
made. 
Assumption 3: The area of the repair is 2.25 times the size of the damaged area. 
4.6.4 Estimating Repair Quantities for Unreported Quantities 
Based on Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the raw data was completed to produce statistically useful 
figures. Using the completed data, the relationship between the damaged areas as a function of 
each Shuttle launch was determined. Figure 20 shows the damaged areas with the corresponding 
Shuttle launch dates. The markers in the figure (representing the size of damaged areas) show no 
trend, and appear to be randomly scattered. However, as found in Figure 14 through Figure 17, 
there are trends that correlate cumulative damage occurrences and cumulative launch activities. 
Therefore, cumulative measures were evaluated to identify possible patterns. Markers 
representing the size of damaged areas show no trend and seem to be randomly scattered. As a 
result of any identifiable pattern, cumulative cause and effect relationships were investigated. 
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Figure 20. Damaged Areas with Dates of Shuttle Launches 
Figure 21 and Figure 22 show the cumulative damaged area versus cumulative number of 
launches using the adjusted data for LC 39A and 39B, respectively. The cumulative sums of the 
damaged areas (in both figures) continually increase. This pattern would be expected to continue 
in the future. However, an analysis of the data indicates that, different trends are apparent for 
LC 39A and LC 39B. The mathematical analysis of the data for LC 39A indicates that the 
cumulative repairs (as a function of cumulative Shuttle launches) is a quadratic function with an 
R-squared of0.93. In contrast, LC 39B exhibits a linear relationship with an R-squared value of 
0.98. 
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Considering that degradation is a continuous process that affects structural materials with the 
increasing number of cumulative launches, the incremental size of damaged area is expected to 
increase. Therefore, the quadratic model for LC 39A is a reasonable forecast of the cumulative 
damaged area (as a function of the cumulative launches). 
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Figure 22. Cumulative Damages vs. Cumulative No. of Launches- LC 39B 
The two equation models shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22 can be used to forecast the 
cumulative damage area of the refractory concrete as a function of the number of Shuttle 
launches. The closeness to 1 of the R-squared values signifies an excellent statistical fit of the 
data. Forecasted damage areas include all minor and major repairs, major replacements, and/or 
rehabilitations of the refractory concrete lining materials. 
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In comparison to the quadratic model in Figure 21, the linear model in Figure 22 can be 
considered conservative. Increases in cumulative area of damage are much more subdued as the 
number of Shuttle launches is increased with the linear model than with the quadratic model. 
Consequently, the research team chose the linear model to forecast cumulative damages. Doing 
so will reduce the likelihood that launch related costs would be overstated. 
4.6.5 Unit Repair Cost per Square Foot 
The average unit cost of a Fondu Fyre repair is approximately $200/sq. ft. if the repair does not 
require welding. When welding is required, the average unit cost is approximately $400/sq. ft. 26 
Based upon the Fondu Fyre damage history,27 there are a total of33 records that indicate whether 
welding is required to make the repair. A summary of this data is shown in Table 9 and indicates 
that approximately 45.4% of the repair to the refractory concrete coating requires welding. Based 
upon this data set, Assumption 4 was formulated for the data analysis: 
Assumption 4: On average, half of the damages will require welding. So, the average 
repair cost per sq. ft. of the damage area is $300/sq. ft. ($300/sq. ft = ($200/sq. ft. + 
$400/sq. ft.)/2). 
Table 9. Welding vs. No Welding 
Launch Complex Total Number of With Welding Without Welding •;. Welding Records 
39A 17 8 9 47.1% 
39 B 16 7 9 43.7% 
Total 33 15 18 45 .4% 
4.6.6 Summary of Data Analyses on Fondu Fyre Damage History 
As a result of the preceding data analysis related to refractory concrete repairs, the following 
methodology summarizes the requirements and assumptions for the refractory concrete cost 
analysis: 
• The cumulative sum of damaged areas increases with the cumulative number of Shuttle 
launches according to the identified relationship in the following equations. 
o For Launch Complex 39A: Y = 2.607 x 2 + 78.539 x 
o For Launch Complex 39B: Y = 106.28 x 
Y is the cumulative sum of damaged area 
x is the cumulative number of Shuttle launches. 
26 NASA Refractory Concrete Technical Interchange, August 13, 2008. 
27 Engineering Review Board (2008), "Fondu Fyre Historical Liberation" (Action Response for Debris Integration 
Group), NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida. 
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• The area of repair (as a function of initial damage estimate) is a factor of2.25 times the 
initial estimate. 
• The average repair cost for the refractory concrete is $300/sq. ft. 
• The total repair costs include a markup factor of 1.25 for contractor markup, and an 
overhead factor of 1.05, which is attributable to NASA oversight.28 
An analysis has been performed to determine the probability of damage (for each component of 
the flame deflector system) using the Fondu Fyre damage data29 and the Space Shuttle launch 
history.30 This analysis found that LC 39A and LC 39B have somewhat different flame deflector 
damage probabilities. In general, the flame deflector system at LC 39A has experienced more 
damage than LC 39B. 
The highest probabilities of damage occurrences were related to the refractory concrete coating 
on the MFD. More significant damage was recorded for the SRB MFD, as compared to the 
SSME MFD. This relationship was exhibited at both launch complexes, and is as expected 
considering the higher temperatures, ablation, and acid content from the SRB exhaust. A detailed 
description of the analysis is provided in Appendix C. 
4.7 Potential Safety Issues and Related Costs 
Significant damage on the flame trench occurred when Discovery (STS-124) was launched from 
LC 39A on May 31 , 2008. This incident resulted in the liberation of numerous refractory 
firebricks that were launched downrange. Any one of these foreign objects had the potential to 
cause significant damage to KSC's GSE and the Space Shuttle, thereby compromising the safety 
of launch personnel. 
With the potential for such a large quantity ofFOD to be ejected during a launch, safety must be 
considered as a disastrous and consequential effect. This study does not investigate the potential 
effects ofFOD, and the astronomical costs associated with a Shuttle accident. Doing so would 
clearly leverage the data, and favor the development of new refractory materials. It is expected 
that construction of a new flame deflector that utilizes technologically advanced refractory 
materials will significantly reduce risks associated with FOD and significantly reduce costs 
associated with a catastrophic event. 
28 NASA Refractory Concrete Technical Interchange, August 13, 2008. 
29 Engineering Review Board (2008), "Fondu Fyre Historical Liberation" (Action Response for Debris Integration 
Group), NASA Kennedy Space Center, Florida. 
30 Space Shuttle Mission Archive. http: //www.nasa.gov/mission pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/list main.html (Last 
accessed January 22, 2009). 
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S LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS 
The approach used to generate the economic analysis for the flame deflector at KSC's LC 39A 
and LC 39B is discussed here. This LCC analysis is an economic analysis tool that is used to 
compare the relative merit of competing project alternatives. 31 The basic steps for the analysis 
are similar in all cases. Using this approach, the following steps were used to conduct the LCC 
analysis. 
a. Define the objective. 
b. Generate alternatives. 
d. Determine costs and benefits. 
c. Formulate assumptions. 
e. Compare costs and benefits and rank alternatives. 
This process was used to evaluate the economic worth and relative merit of a technologically 
advanced refractory concrete; by analyzing initial costs, and discounted future costs such as 
yearly maintenance and refurbishment. 
The first three assumptions were discussed in previous sections of this report. A more succinct 
discussion of the required assumptions will be discussed to present the analysis in a succinct 
manner. 
S.l Objective 
This project considers the development of technologically advanced refractory materials for the 
launch pads at KSC. Current launches cause damage to the refractory protection system which is 
comprised of refractory concrete, firebrick, and a steel support structure. 
Launch related damages require repairs on a routine basis, so that minimum program 
requirement levels are maintained for successive launches. When routine repairs are not 
economically feasible, the complete refurbishment of the structure (or components) can be 
considered as an alternative. Figure 23 depicts a typical life cycle process for a structure. 
31 FHW A Interim Technical Bulletin "Life-Cycle Cost Analysis in Pavement Design," FHW A-SA-98-079, 1998. 
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Figure 23. Life Cycle of the Structure 
5.2 Alternatives for Analyses 
The current economic analysis considers the following three repair scenarios: 
• Alternative 1: Performing current repair practices without entire replacement; 
• Alternative 2: Refurbishment of the entire flame trench using the current refractory 
concrete (Fondu Fyre); and 
• Alternative 3: Refurbishment of the entire flame trench using technologically advanced 
refractory ceramics. 
Alternative 1: Existing Practice 
Alternative 1 assumes that the current flame deflector system will continue to be repaired 
following current practice. No major replacement of components or materials will be performed. 
This alternative assumes that the current trend, associated with increased damage from launch 
will continue, and current repair activities continue. In essence, the frequency of damage will 
continue to increase. 
Alternative 2: Reconstruction with Existing Refractory Concrete 
Alternative 2 assumes that NASA will reconstruct the entire flame deflector system and will use 
Fondu Fyre WA-1G as the refractory concrete coating. As a result, minimal repairs will be 
required from initial launch activities, but the extent of the damage and resulting costs will 
continue to current levels. 
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Alternative 3: Reconstruction with New Refractory Ceramic 
Alternative 3 assumes that LC 39A and LC 39B will be constructed using technologically 
advanced refractory ceramic materials. It is expected that the new protection system will be 
resistant to fractures, cracks, and spalling. Additionally, it will provide superfluous wear 
characteristics, and at the same time, will be able to provide cost effective servicing after the 
initial installation. The major expectations of the new refractory ceramic protection system are: 
• extended life-cycles, 
• extended repair cycles, and 
• 50% reduced costs associated with maintenance, and an increased lifespan that results in 
an overall savings of 75%. 
5.3 Determination of Costs and Benefits 
5.3.1 Routine Maintenance 
Routine maintenance is performed through either USA Contracts or USA Standing Ground 
Operations. Therefore, the use of the technologically advanced ceramic material is expected to 
reduce USA Contracts and USA Standing Ground Operation costs. A reduction in contractor 
markup and NASA oversight will result from the integration of the technologically advanced 
ceramic materials. 
5.3.2 Safety 
Safety is of the utmost importance to all personnel. FOD is a top priority at the KSC launch 
complexes. All KSC employees are informed of this, routine messages are sent out to reinforce 
the importance of this issue, and specialized FOD training is provided as a requirement for area 
access in certain locations (including the launch pad areas). Loose objects are undesirable at the 
launch pads, but the FOD program requirements state that loose objects can be no larger than the 
size of a quarter or 0.016g in mass.32 
Costs related to safety do exist, though the estimation of these costs is difficult and qualitative. 
POD has been monitored during launch operations. It should be noted that the possible effects of 
POD could be disastrous and extremely costly. 
Due to the limited safety related data associated with the refractory concrete, the current study 
does not determine the costs related to these issues. However, the research team maintains that 
the replacement of the current refractory products, with those that are more technologically 
advanced, would significantly reduce FOD related threats during launch. By not including this 
variable, the analysis is considered to be conservative (i .e., the benefits are likely 
underestimated). Adding safety related costs to the analysis would have greatly favored the 
development of a new material. 
32 NASA NE-M9 "KSC Corrosion Control Overview for Stennis Space Center," March 13, 2008. 
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5.3.3 Licensing 
The developed technology can be used in other industries, even though it will be specifically 
developed for NASA. Often, technology development for NASA systems is carried out by 
NASA researchers, and is licensed to industry where it can be used by other industries. The 
development of a technologically advanced refractory system would have additional uses in 
industry and for other government agencies. The successful transfer of this technology to private 
industry is estimated to produce royalties. 
There are many factors that come into play when determining royalties. The type oflicense 
(exclusive or nonexclusive), the strength of the patent, the state of the technology, competing 
technologies, and the amount of capital a company will have to invest to bring the technology to 
market, (etc.). As a result of these variables, a benefit (after licensing expenditures) associated 
with licensing was determined to be unquantifiable and was not included in this life cycle cost 
analysis. 
5.3.4 Schedule 
No Space Shuttle launch delays have been directly attributable to corrosion. While the possibility 
of launch delays due to the refractory system may exist, the probability of occurrence and 
associated costs were not deemed quantifiable as a part of this study. 
5.3.5 Maintenance Costs Associated with the Advanced Refractory Concrete 
The new refractory coating system is being formulated for use with ordinary methods of 
application. The new refractory is being designed so that it can be gunned in place. The ease of 
application associated with this method results in reduced labor costs associated with the 
maintenance of the refractory concrete products. 
5.3.6 Product Availability 
The current refractory concrete material, Fondu Fyre W A-1 G, was developed solely for NASA, 
and is the only material available for use. However, it does not meet qualification requirements 
ofthe current specification, KSC-SPEC-P-0012 (April25, 1979). Consequently, if the 
production of the material suddenly became unavailable, launch schedules will be jeopardized, 
and there will be increased costs associated with launch delays. 
5.3. 7 Summary of Costs and Benefits 
Benefits associated with the refurbishment of the flame deflector (with technologically advanced 
ceramic materials) will include higher initial performance levels, reduced damage per Shuttle 
launch, lower frequencies of repair (longer repair cycles), and enhanced safety. Other potential 
benefits could include reduced material costs for labor and materials and licensing royalties. 
The use of technologically advanced materials is intended to provide a more durable protection 
system for the steel base structure, which will be better able to retain its integrity under launch 
conditions. Consequently, the economic feasibility of developing and implementing new 
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refractory materials is determined to assess the viability of developing advanced refractory 
materials for LC 39A and LC 39B. 
S.4 Assumptions 
The current economic cost model investigates the feasibility of developing a technologically 
advanced refractory system through a life cycle cost approach. To complete the analysis, the 
following assumptions were developed. 
S.4.1 Period of Analysis 
This forecast assumes a life cycle of20 years, beginning in 2014, when the current research 
project is anticipated to be complete. The resulting savings to investment ratio (SIR) is therefore 
based upon this term. 
S.4.2 Discount Rate 
To assess the effects of the time value of money on the investments and relevant costs and 
savings, an interest rate is assumed to estimate the net present value. According to the 
government guideline33 for economic analyses for federal investments, which is also referenced 
by the ''KSC Cost Engineering Desk Reference,"34 the current economic analysis used an annual 
interest rate of2.7% for a 30-year forecast. 
S.4.3 Number of Future Launches 
Future Shuttle launches are only planned for the next two years. 35 According to the plan, 
10 Shuttle launches will occur in that period. Based upon this plan, the current economic analysis 
assumes that there will be 5 Shuttle launches per year for this period. It is also assumed that 
NASA will (at least) continue this trend with future programs. 
S.4.4 Treatment of Future Costs and Benefits 
Repair costs and frequencies have been determined for LCC analysis, based on the data analyses 
performed using the actual data collected in this study. The analyses and assumptions were 
described in Section Error! Reference source not found •. Table I 0 summarizes the variables 
used in the life cycle cost analysis. The reduction factor in Table I 0 represents the reduction in 
the damaged area resulting from improved material performance (500/o), as well as an increased 
benefit from the technologically advanced material (Alternative 3) lasting for longer durations. 
The costs for reconstruction (using Fondu Fyre and the new refractory ceramic) are estimated, 
and the analysis is insensitive to these values. However, the analysis could be sensitive to the 
difference between these values- this will be evaluated later. The research team made general 
assumptions in quantifying these values. As a result, $1M was believed to be a reasonable, and 
likely the upper limit to implement this new material. 
33 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a094/a94 appx-c.html. 
34 Butts, G., "Cost Engineering Desk Reference (Draft)," 2006, p. 246, http://www.ksc.nasa.gov/nasa-
only/finance/Cost EST/index files/Data/Estimatin&",.Y20Desk%20Reference I 09.pdf (Last accessed April 9, 2008). 
35 http://www.nasa.gov/missions/highlights/schedule.html . 
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Table 10. Variables Used in the Life Cycle Analysis 
Variables Values Comments 
Entire Replacement Costs $9,000,000 For Alternative 2 Using Fondu Fyre 
Entire Replacement Costs $10,000,000 For Alternative 3 Using New Refractory Cemmic 
Research Development Costs $10,000,000 For Alternative 3 
Ratio of Repair Area 2.25 Repair Area= Damaged Area x 2.25 to Damaged Area 
Repair Cost Fondu Fyre $300/sq. ft . Average of$200/sq. ft. (without welding) and $400/sq. ft. (with welding) (Direct Cost) 
Steel Structure $168,000/Shuttle Refer to the estimation in Table 4 
Contmctor Markup Factor 1.25 Estimate from Refractory Technicallnterchange36 
NASA Overhead Factor 1.05 Estimate from Refractory Technical InterchangeJ7 
Reduction Factor For Alternative 3, based on the expectations: (Reductions in Damage 75% 
Using New Refractory Ceramics) 50% reduction in damage and lengthened repair intervals 
The reconstruction costs using the Fondu Fyre was estimated based on the exposed surface areas 
of the deflectors (~$15,000 /sq. ft.) and the trench (~$27,000/sq. ft.) . The reconstruction cost 
should be significantly lower than the repair costs and the research team assumed a unit cost of 
$150/sq. ft. based upon a prior reconstruction effort in 1995.38 Multiplying this unit cost by 
21,000 sq. ft. results in a cost of$3.15M per launch pad, for a combined total of$6.3 M for both 
complexes. The research team also assumed that $2. 7M would be required to rehabilitate the 
underlying structural steel. Consequently, the total cost for the reconstruction was estimated to 
be $9M. An additional $1M was assumed to be required for the startup production and 
implementation of the technologically advanced refractory ceramic. This figure is likely an upper 
limit estimate. 
5.4.5 Major and Minor Repair Cost Models 
The two equation models were used to forecast the cumulative refractory damage areas, and was 
discussed and illustrated in Figure 21 and Figure 22. They are described as follows: 
Y = 2.607x2 + 78.539x (for LC 39A) 
Y = 1 06.28x (for LC 39B) 
Y = cumulative sum of damaged areas 
x = cumulative number of Shuttle launches 
The procedure for performing these forecasts , using these equation models , is described in detail 
in Section 5.4.6. 
36 NASA Refractory Concrete Technical Interchange, August 13, 2008. 
37 NASA Refractory Concrete Technical Interchange, August 13, 2008. 
38 Repair of the Flame Deflectors at LC 39A and LC 398, Contmct No. NAS10-12232, July 6, 1995. 
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5.4.6 Forecasts in Life Cycle Cost Analysis 
The current LCC analysis forecasts repair costs for Fondu Fyre (for Alternatives 1 and 2), the 
new refractory ceramic (for Alternative 3), and the steel base structure. These forecasts are 
described in detail as follows. 
• Fondu Pyre/Refractory Ceramic repair forecasts : The two equation model is used to 
predict the cumulative Fondu Fyre damage areas as a function of the cumulative number 
of launches from LC 39A and LC 39B. From these cumulative measures, the model 
calculates differentials (annual amount of damage) between the cumulative predictions, 
and applies the 2.25 repair to damaged area ratio to estimate the required area of repair. 
Direct repair costs are estimated using the unit repair cost per square foot ($300/sq. ft.). 
The factors for contractors' markup and NASA's overhead are then applied to determine 
the loaded cost of repair. For Alternative 3 (to forecast the damage to the refractory 
ceramic), a "reduction factor" is used. The reduction factor is 75%. 
• Steel base structure forecast: The annual average cost of the structural steel repairs 
($168K from Table 4) is used to predict future costs. Factors for contractors' markup and 
NASA overhead are applied to obtain a fully loaded cost of repair. For Alternative 3, the 
"reduction factor" of 75% is used. 
The different alternatives were discussed in Section 5.2. For clarity, they are summarized in 
Table 11. 
Table 11. Specific Variables for Different Alternatives 
Alternatives Specific Variables 
Alternative I -None 
Alternative 2 -Entire reconstruction costs with the existing refractory concrete (Fondu Fyre) 
- Entire reconstruction costs with new refractory ceramics 
Alternative 3 - Research development costs 
- Reduction factor 
5.4. 7 Forecasts on Existing Practice- Alternative 1 
Alternative 1 assumes that Fondu Fyre W A-1 G will be used, without the complete replacement 
of the flame deflector assembly. Figure 24 forecasts cumulative repair expenditures as a function 
of Shuttle launches for Alternative 1. The trend of increasing damage (and the resultant repairs) 
as a function of Shuttle launches is evident. 
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Figure 24. Cumulative Repair Costs - Alternative 1 
Figure 25 shows the cumulative net present value (NPV) of total costs. The interest rate discount 
factor (2.7%) was used to calculate future values throughout the life cycle analysis. 
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Figure 2S. Cumulative NPV of Total Costs - Alternative 1 
5.4.8 Forecasts on Reconstruction with Refractory Concrete - Alternative 2 
Alternative 2 assumes that the flame deflector system will be completely reconstructed using the 
current refractory material (i.e., Fondu Fyre W A-1 G). As a result of this refurbishment, the flame 
deflector will exhibit improved resistance to degradation in the early years of the facilities life. 
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Figure 26 provides a forecast of the cumulative repair costs for Alternative 2. Compared to the 
forecast for Alternative 1, Alternative 2 shows cumulative repair costs that are lower. An 
estimate of the cumulative repair costs for Fondu Fyre was made using the same quadratic 
function as that for Alternative l , which relies on the cumulative number of launches. Because of 
the new construction, the launches start from a value of zero, which results in an increased 
resistance to degradation early in the early years of operation. 
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Figure 26. Cumulative Repair Costs - Alternative 2 
Figure 27 shows the cumulative NPV of total costs including the entire replacement costs, The 
2014 construction value is a significant factor in the cost of the facility. 
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Figure 27. Cumulative NPV of Total Costs - Alternative 2 
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5.4.9 Forecasts on Reconstruction with Technologically Advanced Refractory 
Materials - Alternative 3 
Alternative 3 assumes that LC 39A and LC 39B will be reconstructed using technologically 
advanced refractory ceramic materials. It is expected that the new protection will result in a 
system that will remain free from fractures, cracks and spalling; and will exhibit normal wear 
characteristics with reduced serviceability costs. 
Figure 28 shows the forecasted cumulative repair costs for Alternative 3. Compared to the 
forecasts for the other alternatives, the repair costs for Alternative 3 are significantly lower. This 
is due to the enhanced protection associated with the new refractory ceramic. 
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Figure 28. Cumulative Repair Costs - Alternative 3 
Figure 29 shows the cumulative NPV costs that are attributable to the replacement of the 
product, future maintenance, and upfront research costs. Obviously, capital expenditures 
associated with research and construction efforts are significant. 
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Figure 29. Comparison of Refractory Alternative Repair Costs 
5.4.10 Comparison of Alternatives 
Figure 30 compares the yearly repair costs for the three alternatives. The comparison clearly 
shows a significant reduction in repair costs and in improved performance that result from the 
use of the technologically advanced refractory coating (Alternative 3). 
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Figure 30. Cumulative NPV of Total Costs- Alternative 3 
Figure 31 shows the cumulative NPV costs for the three alternatives. This figure combines all 
relevant repair costs which include refurbishment costs (Alternatives 2 and 3) and research/ 
development costs (for Alternative 3). 
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Significant differences in cumulative NPV costs that result from the initial capital requirement 
are shown in the initial. At the beginning of the life cycle, Alternative 3 had the largest total 
expenditure in comparison to the other two alternatives. However, due to a reduction in 
maintenance costs over time, the total cumulative NPV for Alternative 3 becomes significantly 
lower than those for Alternatives l and 2. 
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Figure 31. Comparison of Cumulative NPV of Total Costs 
Figure 32 provides a comparison of the benefits between the alternatives. Figure 32 shows the 
cumulative benefit of one alternative over another alternative as determined by taking the 
difference between their respective cumulative NPV values. As shown in Figure 32, 
Alternative 2 will produce modest future benefits in comparison to Alternative 3. This is 
reasonable, since one would expect improved long term performance using a technologically 
advance refractory material. The benefits associated with using Alternative 2 are lower than 
Alternative 3, but provide the shortest payback period (approximately 5 years). A comparison of 
Alternative 3 and Alternative 1 indicates that Alternative 3 exhibits long term benefits that far 
exceed Alternative 1. 
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5.4.11 Determination of Economic Feasibility 
Two criteria are commonly used to determine the economic feasibility of one invesbnent 
decision over another in a LCC analysis. They include the SIR and discounted payback period 
(DPP). 
According to the KSC Cost Engineering Desk Reference,39 the SIR for an alternative system 
should be at least 1.5, and the DPP should be in the single digits. The appropriate calculations are 
as follows: 
SIR 20 years Savings with New System 1 5 (th . . 1 ) = > . e JDirumum va ue 
Material Development Costs 
DPP = Years required to recuperate development costs < 10 years 
Based on the result from the economic model, the following values are obtained. 
• For Alternative 3 over Alternative I 
o Savings to Invesbnent Ratio: SIR= $32M = 3.2 > I.5 
$10M 
o Discounted Payback Period = 202I - 20 I4 = 7 years < I 0 years 
39 Butts, G., "Cost Engineering Desk Reference (Draft)," 2006, p. 246, http://www.ksc.nasa.gov/nasa-
only/finance/Cost EST/index files/Data/Estimating%20Desk%20Reference I 09.odf (Last accessed April 9, 2008). 
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o Savings to Investment Ratio: SIR= $l?M = 1.7 > 1.5 
$10M 
NASA!fM-2013-216321 
o Discounted Payback Period = 2022 - 2014 = 8 years < 1 0 years 
Therefore, the replacement of the launch pads with the advanced refractory material is cost 
efficient, even though research and development costs are necessary to develop the new product. 
The benefits result from significant decreases in launch related damage. 
Safety benefits associated with the technologically advanced refractory material were not 
included in this study. By not including these safety benefits, the SIR for Alternative 3 is likely 
underestimated, and the DPP is likely overestimated. 
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
The economic study determined that Alternative 3 is an economically feasible alternative that 
can provide significant long term cost benefits to NASA. To assess the sensitivity of the 
variables used in the analyses and to determine how these impact the cumulative NPV of the 
benefits from Alternative 3, a sensitivity analysis was performed. 
The major variables that were assessed in the sensitivity analysis are listed in Table 12. The 
sensitivity analysis (completed as part of this study) compares how defmed changes in a variable 
affect the cumulative NPV of benefits when comparing two alternatives. In this case, 
Alternative 3 over Alternative 2 (which is the competing alternative). 
Table 12. Variables for Sensitivity Analysis 
Variables Basis Values Values to be Tested 
Reduction Factor 75% 
(Reductions in Damage (resultant repair costs will be reduced to a 75%to 90% 
Using New Material) quarter of the current repair costs) 
Direct Repair Cost/sq. ft. $300/sq. ft. $300/sq. ft. to $600/sq. ft. (Fondu Fyre) 
Number of Shuttle Launches per 5 Shuttles per year 5 to 7 Shuttles per year Year for the Future 
5.5.1 Reductions in Damaged Areas 
A new refractory ceramic material is expected to remain relatively free from deterioration, and 
should maintain its initial performance for a longer duration (than Fondu Fyre WA-1 G). The 
assumed reduction factor for the base case was 75% (refer to Table 10). This value is reasonable 
considering Fondu Fyre was developed in the late 1950s and has experienced minimal 
improvements. 
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Advances in materials science and engineering have provided scientists with powerful tools to 
significantly improve the performance of material systems. Better performance could be 
expected from the new refractory materials. Thus, three different reduction factors (80%, 85%, 
and 900/o) were assessed, and compared with the 75% reduction base. These are shown in 
Figure 33. 
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Figure 33. Sensitivity Analysis -Reductions in Damage 
The analysis determined that the future benefits will increase with higher reduction factors, 
although changes in the cumulative net present value of the benefits are not significant. 
5.5.2 Direct Unit Repair Cost 
Repair costs associated with the existing Fondu Fyre product was determined to be $300/sq. ft. 
According to a recent article,40 the significant damage to the flame trench walls during the launch 
of Discovery (STS-124) resulted in a 4,500 sq. ft. repair. The damaged areas, initially covered by 
refractory concrete bricks, were repaired using Fondu Fyre. The repair plan was estimated to cost 
less than $2. 7M. The actual repair costs were $2.3M. 
A simple calculation indicates that the unit costs are approximately $600/sq. ft.(= $2.7M/ 
4,500 sq. ft.) for the initial cost estimation, or $510/sq. ft. (= S2.3M/4,500 sq. ft.) for the actual 
costs. This indicates that the costs used in this analysis may be low, and as a consequence, the 
potential influence of unit repair costs of $400, $500, and $600/sq. ft. on cumulative NPV costs 
was assessed. This sensitivity analysis is shown in Figure 34. Clearly, significant benefits can be 
realized iflarger unit costs are used in the analysis. The model is therefore sensitive to unit costs. 
40 htto:/ /spaceflightnow .com/shuttle/sts 124/080626paddamage/ 
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Figure 34. Sensitivity Analysis- Unit Costs 
5.5.3 Annual Number of Shuttle Launches for the Future 
Since the number of future launches is unknown and since this value can influence the 
cumulative NPV of the benefits, an assessment was made of the influence of the number of 
launches on the cumulative NPV of benefits. This assessment is shown in Figure 35. As the 
figure shows, increasing the number of launches has a significant impact on the cumulative NPV 
benefits of Alternative 3. Consequently, increases in the number of launches per year will result 
in enhanced cost benefits (with the technologically advanced refractory material) to NASA's 
launch program. 
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Figure 35. Sensitivity Analysis - Number of Shuttles per Year 
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5.5.4 Reconstruction Costs in Alternatives 2 and 3 
In this LCC analysis, reconstruction costs were assumed to be $9M (Alternative 2 - existing 
refractory concrete) and $10M (Alternative 3 - new refractory ceramic). In both Alternatives 2 
and 3, capital investments associated with reconstruction are significant, so a sensitivity analysis 
is perfonned. This procedure will address changes in cumulative benefits associated with 
alternative reconstruction costs. 
Two analyses are perfonned to address changes in construction costs. The first investigates 
changes for both Alternative 2 and Alternative 3. Clearly, an economic prediction of future 
construction costs is not an exact science and can deviate from expected values. The second 
analysis addresses deviations in construction costs that are related to the implementation of the 
new material (Alternative 3), such as startup costs associated with the production of the 
technologically advanced refractory material. 
5.5.4.1 Deviation in Construction Costs for Alternative 2 and Alternative 3 
The first test assumes a proportional change in reconstruction costs, and compares these changes 
in benefits with the base case: 
• 80% reduction in base costs: 
o Reconstruction costs for Alternative 2: $7.2M (= $9M x 80%) 
o Reconstruction costs for Alternative 3: $8.0M (= $10M x 80%) 
• 120% increase in base costs: 
o Reconstruction costs for Alternative 2: $10.8M (= $9M x 120%) 
o Reconstruction costs for Alternative 3: $12.0M (= $10M x 120%) 
Figure 36 shows the cumulative NPV of benefits with the assumed reconstruction costs for 
Alternative 2 and Alternative 3. As shown, the results indicate that both alternatives are not 
sensitive to a proportional change in reconstruction costs. Since benefits are differences between 
the cumulative costs for two alternatives, the proportional changes (in Figure 36) do not result in 
changes to the benefits. 
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--- Alt.2 - Alt.3: $9.0M (Alt . 2) and 
$10.0M (Alt. 3)- Basis 
-+-Ait.2- Alt.3: $7.2M (Alt . 2) and 
$8.0M (Alt . 3)- 80% of Basis 
---Alt.2- Alt.3: $10.8M (Alt. 2) and 
$12.0M (Alt. 3)- 120% of Basis 
Sensitivity Analysis - Proportional Changes in Reconstruction Costs 
S.S.4.2 Deviation in Construction Costs for Alternative 3 
The second test assumes increases in the reconstruction costs for Alternative 3, while those for 
Alternative 2 remain at $9M. The test cases assume $11M and $12M reconstruction costs, which 
represents a $1M and $2M increase over the base value of$10M. 
Figure 37 indicates the small changes in the cumulative benefits that result from an increase in 
reconstruction costs for Alternative 3. The increases in reconstruction costs reduce the amount of 
the benefits associated with the technologically advanced refractory material and may lead to a 
longer discount payback period. 
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Figure 37. Sensitivity Analysis - Increased Construction Costs for Alternative 3 (Only) 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
As a result of the constant deterioration from launch heat/blast effects and aggressive 
environmental exposure, the refractory materials currently used at the launch pad flame 
deflectors have become very susceptible to failure, resulting in large pieces of refractory 
materials breaking away from the steel base structure. These pieces are projected at high speed 
during launch, and jeopardize the launch complex, vehicle, and safety of the crew. 
The currently refractory concrete (Fondu Fyre) was developed over 50 years ago and has 
exhibited unsatisfactory performance. Most refractory materials are designed to perform well 
when heated at a slow rate and are held at that rate for lengthy periods. The launch complexes at 
KSC require a material that exhibits superior performance when subjected to extremely high 
temperatures that increase at a rapid rate. Further requirements include resistance to temperature 
fluctuations, acoustic loads, ablation, and the corrosive hydrochloric acid in the exhaust of the 
SRBs during launch. To address these needs, an innovative and technologically advanced 
refractory material is required to protect the flame deflectors at NASA's launch pads. This report 
provided the methodology and reasoning to assess the economic feasibility of developing such a 
material. 
This report provides the findings obtained by looking at all the available data on the problems 
caused by the degradation of the current refractory materials used in the flame deflector and 
flame trench system. Data related to the cost and frequency of repair for the different 
subassemblies was collected. These subassemblies included the steel structure of the flame 
deflector, the refractory concrete that is used to protect it, and the refractory firebrick that is used 
on the flame trench and walls. The data was analyzed and integrated into a mathematical model 
that projects future costs as a function of cumulative launches and recurring annualized expenses. 
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i\ 20 year life cycle analysis was performed to analyze the economic benefits associated with the 
development of a technologically advanced refractory system. Using the economic forecasting 
models that were developed, three alternatives were tested: 
• i\lternative 1 - No Launch Pad Refurbishment - Repair with Current Fondu Fyre 
Refractory Material. 
• i\lternative 2 - Launch Pad Refurbishment - Repair with Current Fondu Fyre 
Refractory Material. 
• i\lternative 3 - Launch Pad Refurbishment - Repair with a Technologically 
Advanced Refractory Material. 
The 20 year life cycle analysis showed that i\lternative 3 provided a significant reduction in 
maintenance and repair costs in comparison to the other alternatives. i\n economic analysis 
(comparing Alternative 1 to Alternative 3) showed that the capital investment (associated with 
funding the research to develop the new refractory material) would be recuperated within 
7 years. The Savings to Investment Ratio for this investment decision was calculated to be 3.2 at 
the end of the 20 year life cycle. According to the KSC Cost Engineering Desk Reference, the 
savings to investment ratio for an alternative system should be at least 1.5, and the discounted 
payback period should be in the single digits. The choice of i\ltemative 3 over the other two 
systems meets these criteria. 
A series of sensitivity analyses were performed to address cost assumption concerns associated 
with: 
• Repair cost assumptions 
• Number of future launches 
• Rehabilitation cost estimates 
The sensitivity analyses again showed that the development of a new refractory material 
(i\lternative 3) was preferential to the other alternatives. 
This 20 year life cycle analysis shows the benefits associated with the development of a 
technologically advanced refractory material. This product will provide a significant reduction in 
maintenance and rehabilitation costs over a 20 year period and will reduce the liberation of FOD 
during launch. While a cost associated with safety was not addressed in this study, the 
implications of a catastrophic event resulting from spalled refractory concrete clearly suggest 
that the development of a new material for NASA's launch complexes is a desirable 
consideration. 
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APPENDIX A. NASA'S SHUTTLE LAUNCH HISTORY 
Table A-1. Shuttle Launches at LC 39A 
No. Lauad1 Launch Mlulon Orbiter No. Lauach Lauach Mil loa Orbiter Compln Date Complex Date 
I A 4/ 12/1981 STS-1 Columbia 37 A 2/3/ 1994 STS-60 Discovery 
2 A 11 / 12/1981 STS-2 Columbia 38 A 4/9/ 1994 STS-59 Endeavour 
3 A 3/22/1982 STS-3 Columbia 39 A 7/8/ 1994 STS-65 Columbia 
4 A 6/27/ 1982 STS-4 Columbia 40 A 9/30/1994 STS-68 Endeavour 
5 A 11 /11/1982 STS-5 Columbia 4 1 A 3/2/1995 STS-67 Endeavour 
6 A 4/4/1983 STS-6 Challenger 42 A 6/27/1995 STS-71 Atlantis 
7 A 6/ 18/ 1983 STS-7 Challenger 43 A 91711995 STS-69 Endeavour 
8 A 8/30/ 1983 STS-8 Challenger 44 A 11/ 12/1995 STS-74 Atlantis 
9 A 11/28/1983 STS-9 Columbia 45 A 9/ 16/1996 STS-79 Atlantis 
10 A 2/3/1984 STS-41 -B Challenger 46 A 2/ 11 / 1997 STS-82 Discovery 
II A 4/6/1984 STS-41-C Challenger 47 A 4/4/1997 STS-83 Columbia 
12 A 8/30/ 1984 STS-41 -D Discovery 48 A 5/ 15/ 1997 STS-84 Atlantis 
13 A 10/5/ 1984 STS-41-G Challenger 49 A 71:111997 STS-94 Columbia 
14 A 11 /8/ 1984 STS-51-A Discovery 50 A 8/7/1997 STS-85 Discovery 
15 A 1/24/ 1985 STS-51-C Discovery 51 A 9/25/1997 STS-86 Atlantis 
16 A 4/ 12/ 1985 STS-51-D Discovery 52 A 1/22/1998 STS-89 Endeavour 
17 A 4/29/1985 STS-51-B Challenger 53 A 6/2/1998 STS-9 1 Discovery 
18 A 6/ 17/1985 STS-51-G Discovery 54 A 12/4/1998 STS-88 Endeavour 
19 A 7/2911985 STS-51-F Challenger 55 A 2/ 11 /2000 STS-99 Endeavour 
20 A 8/27/1985 STS-51-1 Discovery 56 A 5/ 19/2000 STS-101 Atlantis 
21 A 10/3/1985 STS-51-J Atlantis 57 A 10111/2000 STS-92 Discovery 
22 A 10/30/1985 STS-61 -A Challenger 58 A 2/7/2001 STS-98 Atlantis 
23 A 11 /26/1985 STS-61-B Atlantis 59 A 4/ 19/2001 STS-100 Endeavour 
24 A 111211986 STS-61-C Columbia 60 A 8/10/2001 STS-105 Discovery 
25 A 1/9/1990 STS-32 Columbia 61 A 311/2002 STS-109 Columbia 
26 A 2/28/ 1990 STS-36 Atlantis 62 A 61512002 STS-1 11 Endeavour 
27 A 11 /15/1990 STS-38 Atlantis 63 A 11123/2002 STS-113 Endeavour 
28 A 4/28/ 1991 STS-39 Discovery 64 A 1/ 16/2003 STS-107 Columbia 
29 A 8/2/1991 STS-43 Atlantis 65 A 6/8/2007 STS-117 Atlantis 
30 A 9/ 12/ 1991 STS-48 Discovery 66 A 8/8/2007 STS-118 Endeavour 
31 A 11/24/ 1991 STS-44 Atlantis 67 A 10/23/2007 STS-120 Discovery 
32 A 1/22/1992 STS-42 Discovery 68 A 217/2008 STS-122 Atlantis 
33 A 3/24/1992 STS-45 Atlantis 69 A 3/ 11 /2008 STS-123 Endeavour 
34 A 6/25/1992 STS-50 Columbia 70 A 5/31 /2008 STS-124 Discovery 
35 A 1212/1992 STS-53 Discovery 71 A 11/14/2008 STS-126 Endeavour 
36 A 4/26/1993 STS-55 Columbia 
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Table A-2. Shuttle Launches at LC 39B 
No. Lau~~eh LauiiCh Mls loa Orbiter No. Lau~~eh La••• Mlssloa Orbiter Complex Date Co!Dplex Date 
I 8 1/28/1986 STS-51 -L Challenger 28 8 7/13/1995 STS-70 Discovery 
2 8 9/29/1988 STS-26 Discovery 29 8 10/20/1995 STS-73 Columbia 
3 8 12/2/1988 STS-27 Atlantis 30 8 111111996 STS-72 Endeavour 
4 8 3/ 13/1989 STS-29 Discovery 31 8 2/22/1996 STS-75 Columbia 
5 8 5/4/ 1989 STS-30 Atlantis 32 8 3/22/1996 STS-76 Atlantis 
6 8 8/8/ 1989 STS-28 Columbia 33 8 5/19/ 1996 STS-77 Endeavour 
7 8 10/ 18/1989 STS-34 Atlantis 34 8 6/20/ 1996 STS-78 Columbia 
8 8 11/22/ 1989 STS-33 Discovery 35 8 11119/1996 STS-80 Columbia 
9 8 4/24/1990 STS-31 Discovery 36 8 1/12/1997 STS-81 Atlantis 
10 8 10/6/1990 STS-41 Discovery 37 8 11 /19/1997 STS-87 Columbia 
II 8 12/2/1990 STS-35 Columbia 38 8 4/ 17/1998 STS-90 Columbia 
12 8 4/5/ 1991 STS-37 Atlantis 39 8 10/29/ 1998 STS-95 Discovery 
13 8 6/5/ 1991 STS-40 Columbia 40 8 5/27/ 1999 STS-96 Discovery 
14 8 5/7/1992 STS-49 Endeavour 41 8 7/23/ 1999 STS-93 Columbia 
15 8 7131 /1992 STS-46 Atlantis 42 8 12/ 19/ 1999 STS-103 Discovery 
16 8 9/ 12/1992 STS-47 Endeavour 43 8 9/8/2000 STS-106 Atlantis 
17 8 10/22/1992 STS-52 Columbia 44 8 11130/2000 STS-97 Endeavour 
18 8 1/ 13/1993 STS-54 Endeavour 45 8 3/8/2001 STS- 102 Discovery 
19 8 4/8/1993 STS-56 Discovery 46 8 7112/2001 STS-104 Atlantis 
20 8 6/21 / 1993 STS-57 Endeavour 47 8 12/5/2001 STS- 108 Endeavour 
21 8 9/ 12/ 1993 STS-51 Discovery 48 8 4/8/2002 STS-110 Atlantis 
22 8 10/ 18/ 1993 STS-58 Columbia 49 8 10/7/2002 STS-112 Atlantis 
23 8 12/2/ 1993 STS-61 Endeavour 50 8 7/26/2005 STS-114 Discovery 
24 8 3/4/ 1994 STS-62 Columbia 51 8 7/4/2006 STS-121 Discovery 
25 8 9/9/1994 STS-64 Discovery 52 8 9/9/2006 STS-115 Atlantis 
26 8 1113/ 1994 STS-66 Atlantis 53 8 12/9/2006 STS-116 Discovery 
27 8 2/311995 STS-63 Discovery 
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APPENDIX B. NASA'S FONDU FYRE IDSTORICAL LmERATION 
Table B-1. Fondu Fyre Historical Liberation- LC 39A 
Damage History SQ FT Repair Area 
Minion Dlltll of SRB SSME West East Trench Trench Comments Demege Extent of Damage STS PAD STS PAD 
Record MFD MFD SFD SFD Well Floor 
Lost Bricks from Aame Trench Floor Near SRB 
STS-1 4/21/1981 ~FD . Size of areas where bricks lost approx. 1 A 41 N 
1 0' X 3' 5' X 6 " 3' X 6" and 3' X 6" 
4/21/1981 Wall cap damaoe X 
STS-2 1/12/1982 ost Bricks from Aame Trench Aoor. 2 A X 
STS-8 9n/1983 Replace portion of refractory c:onc:rete of ~RBISSME MFD durina STS-10 downtime 8 A X X 
STS-61-C 9/1/1989 !Vr&cks in MFO. Cracks in SFD 61C A ? ? ? ? 
STS-36 212811990 ~RB MFD lower west lip 36 A X 
~RB MFD 12 sq. ft. on east lip and 25 sq. ft. on 
STS-39 4/28/1991 ~st lip of Fondu Fyre missing, SRB MFD and 39 A X 
h"rench Wall damaged grid steel and refractory. 
4/30/1991 39 X X 
!Approx. 20% Fondu Fyre missing, SRB MFD 
STS43 8/2/1991 ower lip East and West side, upper east lip, 43 A 970 y 0.2*4852 sq ft ~RB MFD and Trench Wall damaged grid steel 
land refractory. Grid steel and refractory missing 
8/5/1991 43 675 N 
fSRB MFD and Trench Wall damaged grid steel 
land refractory. Grid steel and refractory missing 
STS48 9/17/1991 !concrete and Grid steel missing/damaged; 4' x 48 A 120 X y ~· lower east on MFD, 2' x 4' 2 places on lower 
!west side MFD, 1' x 2' upper west side MFD, 
ower lip on both side flame deflectors. 
STS44 11/25/1991 ~RB MFD and Trench Wall damaged grid steel 44 A ? ? X X land refractory. Grid steel and refractory missin11 
11/25/1991 44 330 32 y 
fSRB MFO west side 6' x 10' missing at lip. SRB 
MFD east side 8' x 10' missing at lip. SRB MFD 
STS42 1/22/1992 refractory and grid steel damaged/missing in 42 A X tvarious places SRB MFD and Trench Wall 
~amaged grid steel and refractory. Grid steel 
land refractory missing 
1/23/1992 42 450 y 
1/23/1992 42 50 30 N 
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Da11111ge Hlatory SQ FT Repair ArN 
Mlaalon Oat& of SRB SSME Wnt Eut tJ'rench Trench Com menta Damage Extent of Damage STS PAD STS PAD 
Record MFD MFD SFD SFD Wall Floor 
~SME and SRB MFD and Trench Wall 
STS-45 4110/1992 ~amaged. Refractory damaged/eroded 45 A 330 
!exPosing grid steel. 
~RB MFD and Trench Wall damaged grid steel 
~nd refractory. Grid steel and refractory missing 
Large sections of ablative missing beneath both 
~ast and west side SRB exhaust holes. Ablative 
STS-50 6126/1992 ~aterial at bottom of SRB flame deflector 50 A X X ~amaged more than usual. Many pieces blown 
o the north. 8' x 12' missing ablative beneath 
~st SRB hole. 10' x 15' missing ablative 
!beneath east SRB hole. Cracks along lower lip 
lof east SFD. 
STS-53 121211992 [MFD Fondu Fyre missing in various places on 53 A X X both SSME and SRB sides. 
121311992 53 X X y no sq I! data 
East SFD pieces missing at lower lip, SRB 
MFD Fondu Fyre and grid steel tom away at 
STS-55 4/26/1993 east side bottom lip 10' x 20', SSME MFD (qty. 55 A 200 9 X 3) 1' x 3' pieces missing 
minor aackinglmissing concrete on Side Flame 
Deflector 
STS-60 21311994 East SFD Fondu Fyre missing in various 60 A ? ? ocations 
2/711994 60 40 y 
4 bricks missing from north end of flame trench 
SSME MFD 4' x 4' eroded grid steel and 4 
aacks 4' long x 2 • wide, East Side Flame 
Deflector chips 4" x 4" in 2 places West SFD 
STS-65 7/811994 SRB side damaged or missing Fondu Fyre 65 A X X ? ? along lower lip. 
SSME MFD damaged or missing Fondu Fyre at 
center. East side wall cap damage. Damaged 
Fondu Fyre along Aame Trench Aoor and west 
Side Aarne Trench Wall 
7/13/1994 65 300 20 50 100 100 y 
STS-68 9/30/1994 SSME Flame Trench Wall Cap Damaged 68 A X 
STS-67 
STS-50 6125/1995 SRB MFD grooves and depressions on lower 50 246 X east end 
STS-71 6127/1995 71 A X 
STS-69 917/1995 North Flame Trench Floor buckled, SRB MFD 69 A X X minor cracking along east lip 
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Minion Data of SRB SSME Wnt Ent Trench Trench Comments Damage Extant of Damage • STS PAD STS PAD 
Record MFD MFD SFD SFD Wall Floor 
MFD damage 2 sq. ft. east side lower lip, 1 sq. 
STS-82 2/14/1997 ft. west side lower lip, 2 sq. ft. east side approx. 82 A 5 y 
8' below top 
Pad safety reported material loss and damage 
o the firewall in the south !lame trench. Debris 
STS-83 4/511997 eam inspection of the north !lame trench 83 A showed a 2-foot by IHnch area of missing 
firewall material from the flame deflector. 
Pieces of material were found. 
SRB MFD chip missing 10' from bottom and 15' 
STS-84 5/16/1997 from west side and crack 3' from bottom 5' from 84 A X N no sq ft data 
westside 
SRB MFD damage along west side lower lip. 
STS-94 7/25/1997 SSME MFD 1.5' x 3' and 1.5' x 2' damage just 94 A X 10 no sq ft data 
east of centertine 
Loose and cracked Fondu Fyre SRB MFD and 
SSME MFD. SSME south slope crack 5' x 3' 
STS-85 8112/1997 ocated T down from top edge and 8' from east 85 A X X no sq ftdata 
side West SFD missing 8" x 6' along bottom 
starting at center and running south 
9/2/1997 85 15 N 
9/2/1997 85 6 N 
SRB MFD approx. 25 sq. ft. of Fondu Fyre 
STS-86 12/811997 needs repaired. Loose bricks on 2nd seam 86 A 125 N south of SSME MFD lip 25' above floor of 
trench 
MFD damage north and south West SFD 
STS-89 2/13/1998 missing 8" x 6' starting at center and running 89 A 2 2 N repair 48hrs ~outh and 8" x 2' starting 1' from north end and 
~nning south 
2/19/1998 89 8 N 
STS-99 2/11/2000 oose refractories in Flame Trench 99 A ? ? 
~SME MFD some loss of refractory. SRB MFD 
STS-98 2/812001 ~ome loss of refractory. Flame trench minimal 
oss of refractory and exposed grid steel 
98 A X X 
STS-100 4/19/2001 ~RB MFD some loss of refractory. SRB Aame !Trench growing amount of exposed grid steel. 100 A X 
STS-111 6/5/2002 Fondu Fyre 6"x7314 x4" think, and numerous 111 A ~maaer chunks 
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Damage History SQ FT Rep~~lr ArH 
Mission Dat.of SRB SSME Wnt Eat Trench Trench Comments Damage Extent of Damage STS PAD STS PAD MFD MFD SFD SFD Well Floor Record 
Minor damage to MFD Large thin pieces 
scattered within 1 00' of North throat of Flame 
STS-117 6/1212007 Trench. Found on South pad surface almost to 117 A ? ? slope Several pieces. Found on East Pad 
Surface. Found South East pad surface Several 
pieces 
East Side North Trench Wall Cap lost some 
STS-118 8/14/2007 Fondu Fyra. No major damage/anomalies. 118 A X Some loose refradory was removed. SSME 
flame trench wall loose & missing bricks. 
8/1412007 118 ? ? 
8/17/2007 118 X repair 68.5 hrs 
STS-120 10/23/2007 SRB MFD Fondu Fyre lost in several locations. 120 A X SRB MFD missill!l Fondu Fvre 
10/24/2007 120 X 
SRB MFD very minor damage. A 12" x 12" area 
STS-122 2113/2008 n the upper east sedion may have 122 A X 
delaminated. A smaler area 6" x 4" liberated. 
East Side Wal Filet above MFD Aame Fence 
STS-123 3/13/2008 refradories liberated approx. 3' x 12'. West 123 A X 
Side Wall Fillet 3' x 3' 
STS-124 6/4/2008 
~est SFD lost 6" x 6" x 12" piece of Fondu 
Fyre, East Flame Trench Wall approx. 2,000 124 A X 
~· ft. of brick liberated 
6/4/2008 124 2000 
STS-126 126 A 
56 
NASAffM-20 13-216321 
Table B-2. Fondu Fyre Historical Liberation - LC 39B 
Damage Hlatory SQ FT Repair Area 
Minion Det.of Comments 
Damage Extent of Damage STS PAD 
Record 
STS-51-l 511311986 ~prox. 34' x 7' area of bricks lost 120' North of the MFD. 51L B 238 
STS-26 8/511985 SRB MFD some erosion and small chip In 26 B X upper west portion ina-eased in size 
STS-27 12/12/1988 SRB MFD missing section of Fondu Fyre 8' 27 B X N no sq ft data from trench wal 
SRB MFD and Trench wal damaged during 
aunch. Refractory and grid steel is damaged in 
various places. Surface appears heavily eroded 
STS-41 10/17/1990 on approx. 20 percent and is cracked or raised 41 B 275 100 N 
in various places. Particle rising vertically out of 
exhaust hole as vehicle clears frame does not 
contact vehicle. 
STS-35 1217/1990 SRB MFD and Trench Wall are 35 B 120 600 y damaged/missing in various places 
SRB MFD and Trench Wall damaged grid steel 
and refractory. Comments: A dark particle 
STS-37 4/1511991 appeared in the ftame trench north of the MLP 37 B 200 25 N 
film review). Three particles were ejected out 
of the north flame trench. 
SRB MFD and Trench Wall damaged grid steel 
and refractory. Grid steel and refractory 
STS-40 617/1991 missing. Combined comments: A minimum of 4 40 B X outside dark/long particles appeared against the X contract 
horizon after being ejected out of the SRB 
flame trench. 
STS-49 
STS-46 8/311992 SRB MFD Damage. 2 smal chunks of Fondu 46 B 30 N Fyra were blasted off. 
SRB MFD Fondu Fyre missing along lip under 
STS-47 9/14/1992 the east SRB Exhaust Hole Fondu Fyre missing 47 B X along east blast hole impingement area (-4' x 
6') 
STS-52 10/26/1992 WaR Cap Along the North end of Aame Trench 52 B X N no sq ft data s aumbling In Various Places. 
STS-56 4/15/1993 ~RB MFD refractory conaete damaged. 56 B 55 N 
STS-57 6/22/1993 
~RB MFD refractory concrete missing along lip. 
~· x 6' section of Fondu Fyre refractory concrete 57 B 50 y 
·s missing 
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Minion Date of Comments 
Damage Extent of Damage STS PAD 
Rscord 
Section of the lower steel lip of the East SFD 
STS-51 9/14/1993 ~s blown off during launch SRB MFD 51 B 30 y 
refractory concrete missing along flame fence 
~t the lower west comer 
9/14/1993 51 40 N 
~RB MFD refractory concrete and grid steel 
y STS-58 10/19/1993 ~issing along the lower east lip and the east 58 B 100 
~amefence. 
~inor damage along lower east lip of MFD, 
missing 3' x 3' and 1' x 2' sections of concrete 
~RB MFD Fondu Fyre damaged during launch 
~long lower east lip. East side flame trench 
STS-61 1212/1993 ~II cap damaged. Minor damage along the 61 B X ower east lip of main flame deflector. 
Refractory concrete missing in 2 places (-3' x 
~·. 1' x 2'). Ablative missing along flame trench 
!wall cap, east side 2 places. East worlt platform 
grating damaged from fondue hitting underside 
STS-62 2/7/1994 lower east SRB deflector Fondu Fyre broken 62 B 55 300 y oose several places 
STS-64 9/12/1994 fSRB MFD damaged/missing Fondu Fyre along least side lower lip. East side wall cap damaged 64 B 120 125 N 
fSRB MFD missing area midway up west side 
STS-66 11/3/1994 fsnd along the lower east side SRB MFD 66 B X damage midway up west side and along east 
~ide tiP 
11/8/1994 66 X no sq fl data 
STS-70 7/13/1995 SRB MFD missing 3' x 3' area along lower east lip and cracked midway up on the west side 70 B X 
STS-75 2124/1996 SRB MFD 2' x 3' chip, North Flame Trench 75 B X X Floor 1' x 2' piece missina 
STS-78 6127/1996 SFD Damage 78 B 45 45 y 
SRB MFD 1 sq. ft. chip on lip 6 ft. from east 
STS-87 2/13/1998 edge and 2' x 4' chip 8' from the west and 12' 87 B 9 N 
above the lip 
STS-95 1213/1998 SRB MFD crack on seam approx. 30' long. 95 B 60 15 y SSME MFD 4.5' x 3' damage at bottom of slope 
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Da11111ge Hlatory SQ FT Repair ArH 
Minion Date of Comments Damage Extent of Da11111ge STS PAD 
Record 
SRB MFD west side 2' x 3' missing at lip. SRB 
MFD east side 3' x 5' missing at lip. MFD 
STS-93 7/25/1999 damage on/near lower lip at3 places, comer 93 B X 
chip on east wall above the lip, and area of 
recent repair on the west wal. \ 
8/24/1999 93 ? ? X repair 22 hrs 
STS-102 3/8/2001 SRB MFD general erosion; 60" x 2" repair and 102 B X 8' x 3' repair in NE corner 
ST5-104 7112/2001 
~RB MFD approx. 40 sq. ft. of repairs needed 
104 B n 11 different areas. Approx. 34" x 51 " of X 
refractory lost and grid steel eroded. 
SRB MFD right side: 4' x 6' chip at lip and 4' x 
4' approx. 15 ft up slope. SRB MFD left side: 3' 
x 4' at lip and 3' x 1 0' with missing Grid steel 
STS-112 10/8/2002 and studs approx. 6' up slope. Flame Trench 112 B X X floor has exposed grid steel 3' x 4' in several 
places. North Rame trench Deflector, 
Significant erosion from left and right boosters; 
f!_nce is damaged with debris at base. 
ST5-114 8/4/2005 MFD lost some Fondu Fyre 114 B ? ? repair 3 099.5 hrs 
ST5-121 7/512006 Loose bricks on east flame trench wall SRB MFD missing upper S.W. corner 121 B X 
7/6/2006 121 X 
ST5-115 5/23/2006 SRB MFD very minor damage. Loose fist sized 115 B X piece of refractory on west fence. 
9/13/2006 East Rame Trench Wall minor spelling of 115 X Refractory adlacent to MFD 
SSME MFD some existing exposed grid steel 
STS-116 11/11/2006 Fondu Fyre found on pad surface under East 116 B X 
side flame detlector shield. 
59 
NASA!fM-20 13- 216321 
This page intentionally left blank. 
60 
NASAffM-2013-216321 
APPENDIX C. ANALYSIS ON DAMAGE OCCURRENCE 
The NASA's Fondu Fyre damage history provides a qualitative description of damages identified 
after Shuttle launches. A close look at the data finds that some Shuttle launches resulted in 
damages, while others did not. The various damages in the NASA's Fondu Fyre damage history 
can be classified by the location of damage as follows: 
• Flame trench walls and cap 
o Trench walls 
o Wall cap 
• Flame trench floors 
• MFD (Main Flamed Deflector) 
o SRB MFD (Solid Rocket Booster Main Flame Deflector) 
o SSME MFD (Space Shuttle Main Engine Main Flame Deflector) 
• SFD (Side Flame Deflector) 
Using the Fondu Fyre damage data, the numbers of Shuttles with and without post launch repair 
were estimated. By counting the number of repairs for each component, the probability of 
damage can be measured for each component using the following equation: 
P b b.li fD 0 Number of Damage Occurrences to A Component ro a 1 ty o amage ccurrence = ______ ..:::... ________ __.:._ _ 
Number of Shuttle Launches 
Table 3-1 provides the estimated probabilities of damage for each component over the last 
28 years (1981 - 2008). As shown, LC 39A and LC 39B have somewhat different damage 
probabilities for the classified components. Generally speaking though, the SRB MFD had a 
higher probability of damage than the SSME MFD. 
Table C-1. Probabilities of Damage Occurrences for Each Component 
Total Trench Wall Trench Floor MFD SFD 
Launch Number of Estimates Refractory Refractory Fondu Complex Shuttle Cap SRB SSME 
Launches Concrete Concrete Fyre 
Frequency 9 3 5 27 13 13 
39A 71 
Probability 12.7% 4.2% 7.0% 38.00/o 18.3% 18.3% 
Frequency 6 3 4 27 4 3 
39B 53 
Probability 11 .3% 5.7% 7.5% 50.9% 7.5% 5.7% 
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